Policy Tools for U.S. Agriculture. by Knutson, Ronald D. et al.
IOC 
rA245.7 I 
73 
).1548 
TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
for 
u.s. Agriculture 
.iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii ____ A r PC 
AGRICULTURAL & FOOD POLICY CENTER 
8-1548 
Revised 
January 1993 
Texas Agricultural Experiment Station/Edward A. Hiler, Director/Texas A&M University System/College Station, Texas 
in cooperation with 
Texas Agricultural Extension Service/Zerle L. Carpenter, Director/Texas A&M University System/College Station, Texas 
[Blank Page in Original Bulletin] 
.~ 
·r "":..o', 
,. I~ 
~J .' • 
; ... . "1,' : 
! . ',~~- . 
", 
.: . 'f ' ~ .. • ,.!,' 1'; .. 
I 
! 
TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
POLICY TOOLS 
FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 
Ronal d D. Knutson 
Professor of Agricultural Policy 
James W. Richardson 
Professor of Agricultural Policy 
Danny A. Klinefelter 
Professor of Agricultural Finance 
C. Parr Rosson 
Associate Professor of International Trade 
Edward G. Smith 
Professor of Agricultural Policy 
and Distinguished Roy B. Davis Professor 
of Agricultural Cooperation 
Agricultural and Food Policy Center 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Texas Agricultural Experiment Station 
Texas Agricultural Extension Service 
Texas A&M University 
[Blante Page in Original Bulletin] 
', . 
\ 
~ ~ .. J' .+' ; .. ; ~. , ;:' " ~~:. i ' :'; 
. , .:~ 
~ . '. . ',! • 
FOREWORD 
This document summarizes what has been learned from more than 60 years of 
experience dealing with more than -100 agricultural and food policy toels. Contemporary 
federal policy regarding agriculture has its origin in the late 1920s. Since that time policy has 
evolved continuously as problems, conditions, goals and/or philosophies toward government 
involvement in agriculture have changed. 
So many policies have been tried or evaluated that it is often said that few, if any, 
truly new policy options exist. It is also said that agricultural policies tend to cycle between 
various degrees of concern about the need for income support, conservation, food assistance, 
and export orientation. These realities make it possible to learn from our experience with 
policy tools that have been tried, as well as those that have been analyzed but for one reason 
or another not tried. 
This is the third edition of agricultural and food policy tools. The first publication 
dated August 1984 had 41 tools. The second dated August 1986 had 69 tools. It was 
honored by the American Agricultural Economics Association with a Quality of 
Communication Award. This edition contains 101 tools. The increased number of tools 
reflects the broadened scope of agricultural and food policy as well as its increased 
complexity. While every Congress and administration since 1980 has vowed to reduce the 
complexity of farm bills, they have not succeeded. This edition, for example, adds a maze of 
conservation and environment tools authorized by the 1990 farm bill. 
Perhaps most important, this publication has no axe to grind. There is no hidden 
agenda. Its purpose is to provide just enough objective and factual information on a tool to 
wet the appetite of a congressional staffer who is thirsty for knowledge, a farm organization 
director who needs to sharpen his/her policymaking tools, or a student whe is involved in 
poljcy education. Because time is valuable, each tool is allotted a single page. 
Keywords: Domestic farm policy, commodity programs, conservation, environment, 
international trade policy, marketing policy, demand expansion programs, food assistance, 
nutrition, food safety, credit policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural policy is a broad term used to encompass government programs that directly 
affect the prices and incomes received by farmers. Producers and agribusiness leaders, 
agriculture related organizations, and government policymakers must sort through a myriad of 
potential policy tools in developing this nation's agricultural policy. 
Each policy tool or government program is intended to deal with a specific farm problem 
in a specific way. For example, target prices raise farm income through direct payments from ' 
the government while support prices raise income by setting a floor on market prices. Some 
policy tools are more effective than others in accomplishing the objectives for which they are 
intended. For example, quotas that dictate the volume a producer can market are more 
efficient in controlling production than acreage reduction programs. Policy tools often have 
side effects that need to be considered before selections are made. For example, whet:t price 
supports are set above world market prices, exports fall. 
This publication provides brief descriptions of individual policy tools that are most 
directly related to agriculture and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The report is 
designed to be a comprehensive list of those policy tools that are used currently, have been 
used in the past, are used in other countries, or have been proposed for use in the United 
States. These tools are divided into five general categories: 
• Domestic Farm Programs - Designed to raise or stabilize farm prices and 
Incomes. 
• Conservation and Environmental Programs - Designed to conserve natural 
agricultural resources and protect the environment. 
• International Trade Policies - Designed to create a more favorable trading 
environment for U.S. farm products. 
• Marketing and Demand Expansion Programs - Designed to improve farmers' 
position in domestic and foreign markets. 
• Food Assistance, Nutrition, and Safety - Designed to improve the level of living 
for everyone who consumes food and natural fibers. 
• Credit Programs - Designed to ensure agriculture an adequate supply of debt 
capi tal at a reasonable cost. 
A single-page summary describes each policy tool with respect to the following: 
• The policy area in which the tool falls. 
• What the policy tool is. 
v 
• The primary objective of its use. 
• When it has been used. 
• Experience with its use. 
• Consequences of its use. 
The following publications offer comprehensive discussions of the policies described in this 
publication. 
• Halberg, M. C. Policy for American Agriculture. Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1992. 
• Hillman, lS. Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade. Boulder, Colo. : 
W estvi ew Press, 1991 . 
• Houck, l P. Elements of Agricultural Trade Policies. Prospect Heights, Ill.: 
Waveland Press Inc., 1992. 
• Knutson, R. D., l B. Penn, and W. T. Boehm. Agricultural and Food Policy. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.l : Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1990. 
• Tweeten, L. Foundations of Farm Policy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1979. 
• Tweeten, L. Farm Policy Analysis. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1989. 
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Policy Tool: Cost-Sharing Assessment Programs 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: A cost-sharing assessment program is a means by which the costs of fann programs 
are shared between producers and the government. The producers' share of the cost is 
covered through an assessment per unit of product marketed. The magnitude of the 
per unit assessment depends on the degree of cost sharing (50 percent cost sharing 
would involve a higher checkoff than if producers shared only 30 percent of the cost) 
and the size of the commodity surplus. The higher the assessment, the lower the 
effective level of price or income support for the commodity. 
Objective: To make the level of income support more responsive to the magnitude of the surplus 
and to help defray a portion of government fann program costs. 
When Used: The 1981 fann bill provided a cost-sharing program for tobacco. A 1982 farm bill 
amendment provided for a cost-sharing program in dairy. For both tobacco and milk, 
cost-sharing programs were implemented only after a serious political threat that the 
whole government price support program for these commodities might be withdrawn. 
The dairy cost-sharing program was reinstated in the 1985 farm bill to pay for a 
portion of the costs of the dairy buyout program (see Dairy Buyout). In the case of 
the dairy buyout, producers who continue to produce milk are taxed to cover a portion 
of the costs for the buyout program. The 1990 fann bill established an assessment for 
nonfat dry milk, cheese, and butter purchases by the CCC in excess of 7 billion 
pounds, milk equivalent. 
Experience: Producer resistance has been substantial to the "assessment" under each program. 
Tobacco cost sharing was eliminated in the 1985 fann bill. Dairymen chose an even 
higher assessment to avoid support price cuts that would have been imposed by 
Gramm-Rudman. Assessments have become quite unpopular with producers. When it 
was suggested that milk producers ought to pay the extra WIC costs associated with an 
increase in the price support level, milk producer support for a 1991 dail)l bill fell 
apart. 
Consequences: • The cost-sharing concept provides an automatic adjustment to the level of income 
support for farmers as government expenditures rise. 
• The political hassle of adjusting income support downward when supports are 
initially set too high is avoided. 
• The assessment reduces government costs and thereby increases the political 
acceptability of farm programs by urban congressmen and taxpayers. 
• The assessment makes the level of income support more responsive to market 
forces. 
• The assessment places the burden of program costs directly on producers, whereas 
price support reduction places the burjen on cooperatives, processors and exporters 
who traditionally hold inventories. 
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Policy Tool: Disaster Program 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: Low yield and prevented plantings payments are paid to producers who, through no 
fault of their own, are unable to plant their crop or harvest a normal yield. 
Objective: To reduce producers' yield and planting risks by providing them a relatively free 
(program compliance may be necessary) crop insurance program. 
When Used: Disaster payments were first authorized by the 1973 farm bill. Disaster payment 
benefits were available from 1973-81 to producers who were in compliance with other 
program provisions. Low-yield payments were made to producers who harvested less 
than 65 percent (75 percent for cotton) of their normal yield. In 1982, the provisions 
of the disaster program were dropped, except for extreme emergencies, to reduce 
government costs and encourage participation in the federal multi-peril crop insurance 
(MPCI). Whenever widespread disasters strike, however, Congress has been inclined 
to provide disaster payments such as in 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. 
Experience: Disaster programs were very expensive and encouraged expanded production of crops 
in high-risk areas. Low-yield and prevented-plantings payments were received mainly 
by dryland producers in the Great Plains and producers in the Delta States. Ad hoc 
disaster programs discourage producer participation in crop insurance. The effect is to 
undermine the crop insurance program. 
Consequences: • High treasury costs are associated with disaster programs. 
• Disaster programs provide producers income assistance when they need it the 
most; namely, after a natural disaster. 
• Disaster programs can encourage production of high risk crops in low rainfall and 
floodplain areas. 
• In latter years, disaster payments were subject to a $100,000 payment limitation, 
thus discouraging program participation by large-scale operators. 
• Benefits from the program are bid into the market value of marginally productive, 
high-risk cropland. 
• Special disaster payments undermine the crop insurance program. 
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Policy Tool: Federal Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: MPCI is a subsidized low-yield insurance program for fanners. 
Objective: To provide federally subsidized crop insurance to producers unable to obtain adequate 
crop insurance elsewhere. To replace the low-yield and prevented-plantings disaster 
program for grains and cotton with an insurance program available to all producers of 
major crops. 
When Used: MPCI for wheat was first authorized under the 1938 Federal Crop Insurance Act. 
Federal crop insurance was available only for wheat from 1939 through 1941 when it 
was expanded to cotton. The program was suspended in 1943 because of low 
producer participation but revived in 1945 with a reduction in counties insured. After 
1948, the program was extended to more counties and crops, including vegetables and 
fruits . 'The program was substantially modified in the 1980 fann bill to provide a 30 
percent federal cost subsidy. In 1981 , the program was expanded to all counties in the 
United States and to most major crops. 
Experience: Federal crop insurance has not garnered high levels of producer participation. 
Participation has been the highest in high-risk, nonirrigated, low-rainfall areas. , 
Problems have been encountered in developing an actuarially sound premium structure 
and in adequately marketing the program to producers. Experience indicates MPCI 
has a high cost of administration relative to commercial insurance. The propensity of 
the Congress to enact ad hoc disaster payments in times of weather adversity 
undermines the effectiveness of the crop insurance program. 
Consequences: • Limited acceptance by fanners leads to adverse loss experience and political 
pressure for disaster payments. 
• Low participation by producers results in high loss ratios and high treasury costs. 
• The program provides more extensive coverage than commercial hail insurance at 
subsidized rates . 
• High premiums discourage widespread producer participation, and low 
participation requires high premiums to make the program actuarially sound. 
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Policy Tool: Findley Payment, Findley Loan 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: Deficiency payment to make up the difference between the formula loan rate and the 
effective loan rate or the market price for wheat and feed grains. 
Objective: To compensate U.S . fanners for adjustments to the formula loan rate made by the 
Secretary. 
When Used: The 1985 fann bill established a formula for calculating the loan rate based on 
historical prices. The Secretary was authorized to reduce the formula loan rate (also 
referred to as the basic loan rate or basic price support) up to 20 pe·rcent to ensure the 
competitiveness of U.S. exports. When the Secretary reduced. the formula loan rate, 
USDA was required to make producer payments to compensate fully for the loan rate 
reduction when average market prices fell below the formula loan rate . The payment 
rate is the formula loan rate less the greater of the market price or the effective loan 
rate. The payment was subject to the $200,000 limit in the 1985 fann bill. The 1990 
farm bill continued the 20 percent loan adjustment subject to supply/demand 
conditions. The Findley payment was made subject to a $75,000 annual limit, 
however. 
Experience: Loan deficiency payments were made each year of the 1985 farm bill for wheat and 
feed grains because the Secretary opted for the maximum reduction in the formula loan 
rates of these crops in 1986-1990. The budget exposure created by payment under the 
1985 fann bill resulted in a $75,000 limit in the 1990 farm bill. 
Consequences: • Adjusted loan deficiency payments can lead to large government payments overall 
and to individual farmers . 
• Adjusted loan deficiency payments reduce the adverse effect on farm income of 
the Secretary's actions to make U.S. exports more competitive in the world market. 
• Adjusted loan deficiency payments reduce income risk for producers. 
• Lower effective loan rates make U.S . exports more competitive in the world 
market. 
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Policy Tool: Flexibility (Flex) 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: Flexibility allows producers to participate in the fann commodity program while 
planting up to 25 percent of their crop acreage base to permitted alternative crops. 
Participating producers retain their crop acreage base. No deficiency payment is 
received on flexed acreage although applicable loans apply. Producers do not receive 
deficiency payments on 15 percent of their acreage base, regardless of whether they 
flex it to an alternative crop. 
Objective: To reduce government costs and provide fanners an opportunity to adjust cropping 
patterns in response to price changes. 
When Used: Mandated in the 1990 budget act, a companion piece of legislation to the 1990 fann 
bill. The first opportunity to utilize the flexibility provisions was with the 1991 crop. 
Experience: Relatively high prices for cotton encouraged farmers to flex considerably to cotton. 
Oilseed production likewise was increased. Producers' net incomes declined because 
of the 15 percent cut in deficiency payments. Flexing to soil-conserving crops did not 
appear to be overwhelming nor did moves to diversification. 
Consequences: • Lowered producer returns, particularly for those who had limited flex options. 
• Provided opportunities to switch cropping patterns in light of technological 
changes, particularly variety improvements. 
• Provided opportunities to implement conservation practices. 
• Reduced incentives for increased production by reducing payment acreage. 
• Increased farmers' ability to respond to price signals in areas where viable 
alternative crops existed. 
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Policy Tool: Income Insurance 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: Income insurance would involve an expansion of the MPCI all-risk crop insurance to 
include both yield and price risk, i.e., total crop receipts. 
Objective: To stabilize farm incomes from the adverse effects of natural disasters and low prices 
and thus replace all supply control and price support programs with a comprehensive 
farm income insurance program. 
When Used: An income insurance program for farmers has not been used in the United States. The 
1981 farm bill authorized an investigation into the feasibility of a federally subsidized 
income insurance program for farmers. 
Experience: None. 
Consequences: • An actuarially sound farm income insurance program may reduce current treasury 
outlays but, as with MPCI, such a program would be difficult to develop. 
• Producers' premiums would likely be unacceptably high, and because the policy 
replaces a "free" risk protection program, producers would likely oppose the 
program. 
• Participation . by farmers would likely be very low, like federal crop insurance. 
• Political pressure to reduce premiums below their actuarially sound levels would 
be substantial. Premiums set too low would lead to excessive government costs 
and could cause the program to act as a supply incentive even in the face of 
surpluses. 
• The program could be flexible enough to be used for both expanding and 
contracting supplies and for shifting production (acreage) from one crop to another 
and from one region to another. 
• The program could discourage production in high risk areas. . 
• Research indicates that the high correlation between crop prices and yields among 
regions would cause the program to fail because losses caused by either low yields 
or low prices would be widespread and catastrophic for the treasury. 
8 
Policy Tool: Marketing Loan 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: Marketing loan is a nonrecourse loan with a repayment rate at the world market price, 
I 
as detennined by ASCSIUSDA. The differe~ce between the loan rate and the 
repayment rate (the loan deficiency payment Irate) is not subject to the basic $50,000 
payment limit. It is, however, subject to a separate $75,000 payment limit. 
Objective: To remove the loan rate price floor and thereby expand exports. 
When Used: Marketing loans were first authorized by the 1985 farm bill . While authorized for all 
price supported commodities, marketing loans were only initially implemented in rice 
and cotton. The 1990 farm bill extended the marketing loan to oilseeds. The 1990 
bill also included a GAIT trigger that mandated implementation of a marketing loan 
for wheat and feed grains in the absence of a GAIT agreement by June 30, 1992. The 
GA IT agreement was not reached so the marketing loan will extend to wheat and feed 
grains in 1993. 
Experience: With the release of government stocks in 1986, largely through generic certificates, 
market prices fell to the repayment level. Foreign country competitors objected 
strongly to increased price competition from U.S. commodities in the world market. 
The marketing loan is most effective in expanding exports when the CCC is releasing 
stocks. If there are no CCC stocks to release, the market price plus loan deficiency 
rates plus producer equities or premiums will exceed announced loan rates. 
Consequences: • Marketing loan repayment rates become the market floor price when not used in 
conjunction with generic certificates that release CCC stocks. 
• Prices become more unstable. 
• Commodities become available for export at competitive world prices, thus 
increasing exports when the CCC is releasing stocks. 
• With an expanded payment limit on the difference between the loan rate and the 
repayment rate (loan deficiency payment rate), large farms have a greater incentive 
to participate in the program. 
• Government program costs increase sharply in the presence of large surplus stocks. 
• Farm program costs for competing exporting countries increase and/or their 
producer returns decline . 
• Domestic processor/consumers gain access to U.S. commodities at world 
competitive prices. 
• Producers' returns increase because of the potential for marketing loan payments 
combined with premiums (equities) that might be offered to secure release from 
the non-recourse loan. 
9 
Policy Tool: Payment Limit 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: Payment limits set a maximum on the amount of deficiency payments, marketing or 
Findley loan payments, and/or disaster payments that a person can receive from the 
government. 
Objective: To limit the level of government benefits received by a single farmer and to minimize 
the image of farmers becoming wealthy from farm programs. 
When Used: With the establishment of direct payments to farmers in the late 1960s, questions arose 
as to the magnitude of benefits received by large-scale farms, particularly rice, wheat, 
and cotton farms. As a result of this controversy, the 1970 farm bill set the payment 
limit at $55,000. In 1973 the limit was reduced to $20,000, escalated to $40,000 in 
1977 and subsequently raised to $50,000. The 1990 farm bill payment limit remains 
at $50,000 with the emergency disaster program limited to $100,000. Benefits·from 
the marketing and Findley Loan are subject to a separate $75,000 payment limit. 
Experience: As the difference between the target price and the loan rate has widened, an 
increasingly large number of farmers have become subject to the payment limit. The 
combination of pressures to reduce government costs by more strict enforcement of the 
payment limit, combined with more farmers becoming subject to the limit, has made 
payment limits more controversial. At the same time, farmer efforts to find legal 
loopholes in payment limit regulations have accelerated. As a result, the payment limit 
may not be very effective in accomplishing its objective. 
Consequences: • Strict enforcement of the payment limit reduces large-scale farmers' incentives to 
participate in farm programs. 
• The wider the difference between the target price and the loan rates, the greater the 
number of farmers who are adversely affected by the payment limit. 
• A larger number of farmers affected by the payment limit was one of the factors 
leading to the marketing loan provisions. 
• Acreage reduction programs are less effective at reducing supply in the presence of 
payment limits. 
• Payment limits encourage larger fanns to divide their operations and/or convert to 
cash rental arrangements that reduce the effectiveness of the limit, create extra 
costs, and thereby make payment limits inefficient. . 
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Policy Tool: Target Prices, Deficiency Payments 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Income Support 
What It Is: In the United States, deficiency payments are paid to farmers to make up the 
difference between a price determined to achieve a politically acceptable income level 
(target price) and the higher of the average market price or the loan rate. Deficiency 
payments are made on each participating farm's payment acres and farm program 
yield. Payment acres equals base acres less idled (set aside) and Flex (normal and 
optional) acres (see Flex). The farm program yield is based on each farm's yield 
history. Since 1985, however, they have been frozen. Although target prices were set 
initially to reflect an average cost of production, they are now legislatively determined. 
Objective: Deficiency payments were initiated to raise and stabilize farmer incomes to the level of 
the nonfarm population, while allowing farm prices to be competitive in the export 
market. 
When Used: Target prices were authorized for cotton in 1970 and for cotton, wheat, com, sorghum, 
and oats in the 1973 farm bill. The 1985 farm bill specified about a 10 percent 
sequential reduction in target prices by 1990. The 1990 farm bill froze target prices at 
1990 levels through 1995. Deficiency payments are paid on eligible crops if the 
average cash price is less than the target price. 
Experience: Initially, target prices were set to reflect changes in the cost of production and yield. 
Much debate ensued over what constituted the cost of production and which costs 
should be included. A 1977 change in the target price formula removed the possibility 
of reducing target prices to reflect yield increases. The 1981 farm program set target 
prices for cotton; wheat, and com for 1982-85 without regarding inflation, crop yields, 
or production costs. Excess production and high government program costs resulted. 
Target price reductions in the 1985 farm bill and frozen target prices in the 1990 farm 
bill, along with Flex and the CRP, substantially reduced production incentives, stocks, 
and government program costs. 
Consequences: • Target prices set above market clearing levels stimulate production and reduce 
market prices, thereby reducing food and feed costs. 
• By reducing market prices, target prices allow U.S. farm products to be more 
competitive in the world market while supporting farm income, i.e. , an implicit 
export subsidy. This is a significant advantage over using support prices for 
raising producer income. 
• Setting target prices above the expected market price can result in large treasury 
outlays . 
• Deficiency payments provide income support of up to $50,000 to large-scale 
producers. Because deficiency payment are paid on eligible farm program yield, 
smaller scale producers receive less absolute support. 
• Deficiency payments reduce income risk for producers and increase their ability to 
obtain financing . 
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Policy Tool: Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Loan, Nonrecourse Loan 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
What It Is: The CCC makes nonrecourse loans at established loan rates for wheat, feed grains, 
rice, cotton, sugar, wool, tobacco, and honey. The loan, plus interest and storage, can 
be repaid within 9 to 12 months and the commodity sold on the cash market. If it is 
not profitable for the farmer to repay the loan, the CCC has no recourse but to accept 
the commodity in full payment of the loan. Commodity loans, therefore, are 
frequently referred to as a price support, since national season average prices generally 
do not fall below set loan levels. Local prices, on the other hand, can fall below the 
loan rate for part of the marketing year, depending on program participation and loan 
eligibility . 
Objective: To add price stability to the market by releasing CCC stocks when prices were high 
and withdrawing stocks from the market when prices were low. To encourage orderly 
marketing of commodities throughout the marketing year by preventing a market glut 
at harvest. 
When Used: The CCC loan program has existed continuously since 1938 for cotton, wheat, and 
feed grains. During World War II, the loan rates for basic commodities were set at 
100 percent of parity to encourage production of crops. In other years, the loan rates 
were set low to avoid encouraging production. 
Experience: CCC loans were effective at stabilizing prices of feed grains during the 1960s when 
the price of com was bounded by the loan rate and the CCC release price (110 percent 
of loan). At various times, political pressure has caused loan rates to be set above 
equilibrium market prices; as result, (a) the loan rates acted as a supply incentive for 
producers, (b) the CCC acquired large stocks of grain and cotton, and (c) the volume 
of exports declined as commodities were priced out of the world market. These events 
resulted in the marketing loan (see Marketing Loan) being authorized in the Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1985. In addition, loan rates were established based on a moving 
average formula of the previous five years' prices. The loan rate formula in the 1985 
farm bill was retained by the 1990 bill to keep loan rates competitive with world 
prices. Further reductions in the loan rate for wheat and feed grains were allowed (see 
Findley Loan) to make them competitive in the world market. 
Consequences: • Loan rates with reasonable release levels act as a price stabilizing force in the 
market and thus reduce price risk for producers and lead to greater production. 
• The CCC loan reduces price risk for farmers and consequently encourages excess 
resources to remain agriculture. 
• The CCC loan program extends the marketing period for producers from 9 to 12 
months and even longer with extensions. 
• High loan rates can effectively price U.S. commodities out of the world market 
and necessitate an export subsidy or direct aid to export surplus CCC stocks. 
• Loan rates based on the cost of production tend to increase without regard to the 
market clearing price and can become a production incentive as a result. 
12 
Policy Tool: Commodity Purchase Program 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
What It Is: Gives the CCC, acting through, the Secretary of Agriculture, the authority to purchase 
commodities for government storage and/or distribution. 
Objective: To support the price of commodities. 
When Used: Market purchases of commodities occur whenever they are offered to CCC at the 
support price under the operation of the price support programs for butter, nonfat dry 
milk, and cheese. Regular purchases of commodities in surplus also occur in 
association with commodity distribution and school lunch programs. Special purchases 
have been mandated in particular instances (e.g., to remove excess surplus of meat 
from market during the dairy baaed program). 
-
Experience: Commodities purchased under special programs (other than price support program 
purchases) are generally those grown by producers who have the greatest political 
influence. The program is frequently used to achieve specific political ends and/or to 
alleviate temporary surplus conditions. Commodity purchases are generally not 
effective in dealipg with long-run surplus conditions or price suppression. Government 
commodity distribution programs to the needy have largely been replaced by food 
stamps; however, some of these programs still exist (see Commodity Distribution). 
Consequences: • Increased purchases temporarily raise market prices. 
• When purchased commodities are distributed, commercial sales of the commodity 
are reduced. 
• Storage costs-for purchases commodities are high unless rapidly distributed. 
• Related processing industries such as packers or milk processors are frequently 
important beneficiaries. 
• Government commodity give-aways are often plagued with inequities, fraud, and 
corruption. 
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Policy Tool: Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Price Support 
What It Is: FOR is a three-year CCC loan for wheat and feed grains. The 1977 farm bill 
established the FOR as a three-year extension of the cee loan after time expires in 
the regular loan. Reserve stocks remain in the producers' hands until the Secretary of Agriculture 
authorizes release or until the extension expires. 
Objective: To stabilize grain prices and provide producers a longer time period to sell their grain . 
To establish a food reserve of grains, thus stabilizing grain supplies and making the 
United States a more dependable supplier. 
When Used: FOR has been in use since 1978 for wheat and feed grains. The program was 
modified in 1980 to allow direct entry, thus avoiding the regular eee loan. In 
addition, producers were given a direct entry loan price higher than the regular loan 
rate in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Stocks in the reserve are eligible for release when cash 
prices reach a level determined in advance by the Secretary of Agriculture. The 1985 
farm bill established upper limits on wheat and feed grain stocks in the FOR as a 
percent of estimated total domestic and export use. The maximum wheat stocks was 
30 percent of estimated use, and for feed grains, the maximum was 15 percent of 
estimated use. The Reagan-Bush administration deemphasized the role of FOR. The 
1990 farm bill gives the Secretary authority to allow FOR entry within certain limits 
and subject to the stocks to use ratio and price conditions. 
Experience: FOR attracts large quantities of stocks when the entry price is set above the 
equilibrium market price. Research has shown that FOR reduces the quantity of stocks 
held by the private sector and causes season average prices to be at either the entry 
price or the release price depending on the supply-demand balance. Within that range, 
prices may be more volatile because of the program pulling prices to either the entry 
or the release price. Under the 1990 farm bill , producers are allowed to redeem FOR 
commodities at their discretion, thus bypassing entry/release trigger induced volatility. 
Consequences: • FOR often results in the accumulation of stocks which, in tum, result in substantial 
storage and interest costs. 
• FOR provides farmers three years to market their grain out of the reserve. 
• Setting the FOR entry price above equilibrium market price creates, in effect, an 
income support program. 
• In the face of declining export demand, there are no provisions to reduce the FOR 
entry price. 
• High loan levels and release prices encourage U.S . and foreign production and 
discourage U.S . exports. 
• FOR supports prices only when producer participation is high and adequate storage 
is available. 
• Upper limits on stocks in the FOR limit government storage costs and prevent an 
uncontrolled buildup of stocks. 
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Policy Tool: Acreage Allotment 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: Acreage allotment is a mandatory mechanism to reduce the production of targeted 
commodities. Acreage allotments require that producers plant within a specified 
number of acres. The number of acres allotted to each fann is based on the fann's 
production history. The allocated acres may be adjusted annually to meet the supply 
objectives. 
Objective: To reduce the quantity produced and consequently the supply of a given commodity. 
When Used: Acreage allotments were used extensively during the 1950s and 1960s for the basic 
commodities. Allotments still exist for tobacco. Allotments were used as a means of 
allocating target price benefits (e.g., with rice from 1976-81). This practice has since 
been abandoned. 
Experience: When acreage allotments were used in the absence of marketing quotas, fanners 
responded by fanning the allotted acreage more intensely, thus increasing yields. The 
result was a tendency for production to return to pre-allotment levels, therefore 
necessitating further restrictions on allotment size. In some commodities, such as 
tobacco, marketing quotas were imposed to control production more effectively. 
Consequences: • Acreage allotments raise domestic prices by reducing production and supply. 
• Benefits from acreage allotment programs are bid into the price of land and/or the 
allotments, if allowed to be traded. 
• High cash outlays to purchase allotments act as a barrier to entry for many 
farmers, especially those just beginning. 
• Acreage allotments restrict the ability of farmers to change their crop mix in 
response to changes in relative crop prices. 
• When allotments are imposed on one crop, surpluses may arise in other crops as 
farmers use non-allotment acres to produce other crops. Thus, allotments are often 
imposed on those additional crops. 
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Policy Tool: Acreage Reduction, Set-Aside, and Diversion 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: Acreage reduction consists of an annual acreage set-aside and/or acreage diversion that 
is generally voluntary. Acreage set-aside programs require that participating fanners 
idle and devote to a conserving use a percentage of their crop base acres in order to be 
eligible for other program benefits. Acreage diversion programs pay producers a given 
amount per acre to idle a percentage of their base acres. A fann's base acres are 
detennined by the production history of the crop. 
Objective: To reduce the quantity produced and thus the supply of a given commodity. 
When Used: Acreage set-asides and diversions were used extensively during the 1960s and have 
been used continuously since 1977. These programs are generally used when prices 
are depressed due to a stock buildup. During the early 1980s when supplies were in 
substantial excess, set-aside levels rose to the 20-35 percent range. The 1990 fann bill 
explicitly tied the Secretary's annual acreage reduction decision to the relationship 
between a commodity's ending stocks and its total use. 
Experience: Acreage reduction programs have been only modestly effective in reducing supply over 
the long run. These progran1s have generally been used when loan rates, target prices, 
or market pnces were high enough to encourage fanners to expand production. 
Program participation, nonnally a function of the level of producer benefits, has been 
particularly high for cotton, rice, and wheat during the 1980s. To encourage 
participation, diversion payments may be added to other fann program benefits. By 
the early 1990s, commodity supplies had been reduced sufficiently by low loan rates, 
lower real target prices, expanded export subsidies, and increased CRP enrollment that 
annual acreage reduction requirements were reduced to relatively low levels. 
Consequences: • To the extent that acreage reduction programs decrease production, they reduce 
supply and stocks and raise prices. 
• Effective acreage reduction programs reduce the volume of supply available for 
export. 
• Slippage reduces the effectiveness of the program. (Slippage is that portion of 
reduced acreage that does not result in correspondingly lower production, e.g ., due 
to removing the poorest land.) 
• Diversion programs can result in significant treasury outlays. 
• Payment limitations and offsetting compliance (when used) discourage 
participation by large-scale operators who fann large acreages for multiple 
landlords. 
• Acreage reduction programs tend to restrict a fanner's ability to shift acreage in 
response to changes in relative crop prices. 
• Effective acreage reduction programs increase prices for commodities, costs of 
production for livestock, and prices for food and fiber. 
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Policy Tool: Cross-Compliance, Limited Cross-Compliance 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: Cross-compliance is a provision requiring a farm to be in compliance with the terms 
and conditions of all other commodity programs applicable to the farm as a condition 
of program eligibility for any single commodity. For example, if a farm produced 
cotton and wheat, the farm could not be in compliance and receive benefits from the 
wheat program without also meeting the program requirements for cotton. Limited 
cross-compliance differs from cross-compliance in that a producer does not have to 
abide by the acreage reduction requirements for other program crops on the farm, but 
the producer cannot plant in excess of the established crop acreage base for the other 
crops. 
Objective: Cross-compliance has multiple objectives including those of reducing production, 
reducing government program expenditures, and reducing a commodity program's 
adverse impacts on other commodities. 
When Used: Strict cross-compliance provisions have not been enforced since the 1960s. Limited 
cross-compliance authority was implemented in the late 1970s and authorized in the 
1985 farm bill. Cross-compliance requirements were eliminated in the 1990 farm bill 
and new flexibility provisions were incorporated to allow limited planting of 
alternative crops. 
Experience: While cross-compliance theoretically is essential to implementing an effective acreage 
reduction program for agriculture in general (across crops), farmers and their 
organizations have strongly resisted the implementation of cross-compliance. Even 
though the 1985 farm bill specifically mandated limited cross-compliance, Congress 
was forced to modify these provisions in "technical amendments" to make cross-
compliance an optional decision for the Secretary. 
Consequences: • The cross compliance provision improves effectiveness of production controls 
across program commodities. 
• The provision prevents spillover of surplus acreages and resources to other 
program commodities. 
• Cross-compliance has the potential for reducing government program cost. 
• Implementation of the provision can result in less program participation, especially 
if payment limits are a constraint. 
• Cross-compliance is strongly resisted by farmers and their organizations. 
• Cross-compliance restricts a fanner's ability to shift acreage in response to changes 
in relative crop prices . 
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Policy Tool: Dairy Buyout, Termination Program 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: The Dairy Buyout Program (tennination program) paid dairy fanners to slaughter or 
export their cows and discontinue milking operations for at least five years. Fanners 
submit competitive bids in a buyout program. 
Objective: To reduce milk production, reduce government purchases, control stocks, and cut 
government dail)' program costs. 
When Used: The buyout program was initiated in 1986 after the dairy diversion program proved 
unsuccessful at reducing production. 
Experience: The maximum bid accepted in the Dairy Buyout Program ($22.50/cwt annually over 5 
years) was more than twice as high as the diversion program. Evidence of cow 
trading to circumvent the intent of the program was extensive. Branding of cows 
destined for slaughter or export was objected to by animal rights advocates. Beef 
producers sought legal remedies to ensure that beef prices would not be unduly 
depressed. 
Consequences: • Slippage proved to be at least as big a problem in dail)' as in crops -- acres cannot 
move at night but cows can. 
• Participation was highest in those regions that have the lowest returns over 
variable costs. 
• Fanners who were contemplating going out of business anyway were most likely 
to participate. 
• Buyouts create strong incentives for nonparticipants to increase production. As a 
result, production declines tend to be temporal)'. 
• No long-tenn incentives exist to reduce production. 
• Increased dairy slaughter raises beef supply and depresses meat prices. 
• Animal rights activists become very concerned about branding requirements and 
conditions surrounding the resulting animal slaughter. 
• After the buyout program, beef producer interests became actively involved in 
dairy policy debates, expressing strong opposition to any program that would 
mandate reduced milk production. 
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Policy Tool: Dairy Diversion Program 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: The Dail)' Diversion Program paid farmers $10/cwt of reduced production, from an 
historical base, for an 18-month period. Reduced production was accomplished by 
early culling of cows, reduced feeding, and modified breeding schedules. The origin 
of the name "diversion" is unclear since there is no diversion, just reduced production. 
Objective: To reduce milk production; government purchases; government stocks of butter, nonfat 
dl)' milk and cheese; and government dail)' program costs. 
When Used: The dail)' diversion program was authorized in 1983 and implemented in 1984. Dail)' 
program purchase costs had exceeded $2 billion annually and the government was 
purchasing more than 10 percent of the milk supply. 
Experience: Highest participation was in states that were already reducing production. Participating 
farmers reduced production by the subscribed percentage but many nonparticipating 
farmers increased production. Therefore, total production decreased by only 50 
percent of what was anticipated. Participating farmers who stayed in production had 
their cows and heifers bred to go into a full-production mode at the end of the 
program. Therefore, production increased sharply to record levels the subsequent year. 
Consequences: • Slippage in dairy proved to be at least as large as in crops because of 
nonparticipant increases in production and the temporary nature of the program. 
• Participation was highest in regions that have the lowest returns over variable 
costs. 
• Farmers who were reducing production and/or contemplating going out of business 
were the most likely to participate. 
• Strong incentives for nonparticipants were created to increase production. 
• No long-term incentives exist to reduce production. 
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Policy Tool: Generic PIK 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: A negotiable commodity certificate that can be redeemed by the holder for hislher 
farmer-owned reserve loan, any uncommitted commodities in CCC inventories, or 
cash. The certificates were issued to complying producers in lieu of cash payments for 
a variety of provisions in the 1985 farm bill . The certificate is issued for a dollar 
amount; therefore, the amount of commodity that can be redeemed is detennined by 
the daily redemption price as detennined by the CCC. The negotiability of the 
certificate allows for the sale and resale of the certificate up to its stated expiration 
date. 
Objective: To improve on the economic and logistical problems encountered in earlier PIK 
programs that were applied to individual commodities available only in designated 
locations. 
When Used: Can be used only when stocks are held in the CCC, Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) or 
under price support loan. First implemented in the 1986 farm program after the 1985 
farm bill substantially expanded the authority for PIK. 
Experience: Negotiable commodity certificates are not tied to a specifi"c location or CCC 
commodity. The program offers more flexibility than commodity specific PIK 
programs. The negotiable aspect of the generic certificate allows market forces to 
dictate the allocation of commodities currently in CCC inventories. The market forces 
were evident early in the 1986 program implementation as generic certificates were 
being purchased at prices exceeding their par value. 
Consequences: • Generic certificates may be used in lieu of cash for a variety of farm program 
provisions. Multiple expiration dates, however, can become confusing. 
• Flexibility as to commodity and location allows producers operating in traditional 
surplus-producing regions to benefit pricewise at the expense of producers in 
deficit regions. 
• Market prices tend to weaken as commodities are released from government 
inventories and/or programs. 
• Generic certificates offer considerable flexibility for the seller and buyer and thus 
may result in bids in excess of par value. 
• The provision allows an off-budget mechanism for the release of many CCC held 
inventories. 
• Since certificates are generic, increased incentives to participate in one program, 
(e.g., cotton) may have an adverse impact on the market prices for another 
commodity (e.g., dairy products) if market forces dictate the release of that 
commodity. This cross-commodity price impact has not received a lot of public 
attention but may induce program restrictions in the future . . 
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Policy Tool: Long-Term Land Retirement, Soil Bank, Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: Long-tenn land retirement is a multiple-year voluntary program that removes cropland 
from the production of farm commodities. Requirements are generally imposed 
requiring that a soil-conserving cover crop, including trees, be planted. The 
government generally pays the landowner an annual rental rate plus a portion of the 
cost of establishing the cover crop. (See the Conservation Reserve Program in 
Conservation and Environment Section). 
Objective: To remove from production cropland that is resulting in surpluses or is subject to 
erostOn. 
When Used: The program was first authorized in the 1956 farm bill as the Soil Bank Program. The 
Soil Bank was unpopular because it paid landowners the same per acre rental rate to 
retire lands with different productivity and because of the adverse effects on rural 
communities. In 1965, Congress re-established a land retirement program and called it 
the Cropland Adjustment Program. Funding was authorized for continuation of a long-
tenn land retirement program in 1970 but was discontinued during the world food 
crisis of the 1970s. The 1985 farm bill contained authorization to retire up to 45 
million acres of highly erosive land from production under the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP). Land retirement is politically acceptable to consumers and producers 
when surplus stocks and low prices are chronic problems. If needed, the land can be 
put back into production, as it was in the early 1970s. In the 1985 farm bill, farm 
organizations and environmentalists combined efforts to achieve the dual objectives of 
surplus control and soil conservation. To reduce the adverse effect on rural 
communities, the 1985 farm bill established the maximum acreage that could be 
enrolled in the CRP within a single county at 25 percent of the total cropland acreage 
unless the Secretary of Agriculture detennines that higher participation would not 
adversely affect the local economy. 
Consequences: • Long-tenn land retirement is a supply control and conservation strategy that may 
cost less than paying storage and interest on surplus commodities. 
• Long-tenn land retirement programs can adversely affect local agribusiness and 
rural communities. 
• Increased prices for commodities increase production costs for livestock and food 
prices over time. 
• Land retirement can be used to encourage conservation of cropland, promote 
reforestation, and enhance wildlife preservation practices. 
• Long-tenn land retirement reduces farmers' flexibility. 
• Retired land, properly cared for, may result in greater productivity when put back 
into use . 
• Slippage is generally high because the least productive land is removed from 
production. However, paying for land retirement based on productivity (bid basis) 
increases the efficiency of the program. Slippage may be reduced somewhat if 
whole farms are removed from production. 
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Policy Tool: Marketing Quotas 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: A marketing quota is a mandatory mechanism to detennine the quantity of a 
commodity that can be marketed. The national quo~ set by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, is based on expected domestic and export demands and is usually less 
than nonnal production levels. The national quota is allocated to each producer, based 
on past production. Marketing certificates may be issued to producers holding quotas 
that grant them the right to market a specified quantity of the commodity. The 
certificate, if allowed to be sold, will develop a value detennined through market 
exchange. 
Objective: To restrict production by controlling the quantity farmers are allowed to market. 
When Used: Because marketing quotas are mandatory for all producers growing the quota crop, 
quotas must be approved by a referendum. Farmers historically have approved a quota 
only when a crisis existed. Quotas have generally been used in conjunction with 
allotments and relatively high price supports. Marketing quotas have been used 
regularly for peanuts and tobacco. The 1985 fann bill authorized the use of marketing 
quotas for wheat if proclaimed by the Secretary and approved in referendum by 60 
percent of the eligible producers. These quotas would have been put into effect for the 
1987-90 crop years, but they were never used. 
Experience: Marketing quotas are the most effective means of controlling suppiy. They were 
initially imposed after acreage allotments proved to be ineffective in controlling 
supply. Marketing quotas have effectively reduced production and stock levels but 
only when the national quota was set at levels consistent with demand. 
Consequences: • Once a quota is in place, there is pressure to increase the national quo~ thus 
defeating its purpose. 
• Like other supply control programs, marketing quotas usually reduce the volume 
of exports for the quota crop. 
• Marketing quotas are more efficient in reducing supply and raising price than 
acreage reduction programs because there is little, if any, slippage. 
• Marketing quotas are associated with low treasury costs unless the quota is so 
large that Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks accumulate. 
• Marketing quotas tend to acquire a value that reflects the capitalized added net 
returns producers receive from the program. This value may either be directly 
associated with the quota or, if tied to a land base, capitalized into the value of the 
land resulting in increased land prices. 
• Single crop marketing quotas for major crops (e.g., wheat) adversely affect prices 
of crops planted on the idled acres (e.g., com and sorghum). 
• Increased prices for quota commodities increase the costs of production for 
livestock and food prices over time. 
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Policy Tool: Offsetting Compliance 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: A fann program provision requiring each producer to be in compliance with the 
program for the same crop on all fanns as a condition of program eligibility. For 
example,. if a fanner produced com on three fanns, he would have to meet the terms 
and conditions of the com program on each fann before being eligible for any com 
program benefits. 
Objective: To aid in production control and reduce government program expenditures. 
When Used: Offsetting compliance provisions were used as recently as the late 1970s. The 1985 
fann bill allowed the Secretary, at least implicitly, the authority to require offsetting 
compliance for wheat and feed grains. The bill explicitly prohibited offsetting 
compliance provisions from being used for cotton and rice. The 1990 fann bill 
eliminated the Secretary's authority to require off-setting compliance. 
Experience: While offsetting compliance is essential theoretically to implementing effective acreage 
reduction programs, it is not attractive politically or pragmatically. Politically, as in 
the case with cross-compliance, farmers and their organizations have strongly resisted 
offsetting compliance. Pragmatically, the multiple landlord-tenant relationships that 
exist throughout commercial agriculture make equitable implementation of this 
provision virtually impossible. 
Consequences: • The provision improves effectiveness of production controls within a commodity. 
• Offsetting compliance has the potential for reducing government program cost. 
• Implementation can result in less program participation, especially if payment 
limits are a constraint. 
• Offsetting compliance is strongly resisted by fanners and their organizations. 
• Offsetting compliance restricts a fanner's ability to shift acreage in response to 
changes in relative crop prices. 
• The provision is difficult to implement with the existence of multiple landlord-
tenant relationships. 
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Policy Tool: Payment in Kind (PIK) 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: PIK is an acreage diversion program with the diversion payment in the form of a 
commodity rather than cash. 
Objective: To reduce production, stocks, and/or direct treasury outlays (government program 
costs). 
When Used: PIK was used in the early 1960s for one year. In 1983 it was used for wheat, cotton, 
com, sorghum, and rice; in 1984 it was used again for wheat. The program has been 
active whenever government-owned stocks have reached unacceptably high levels. 
Experience: PIK is one way to reduce stocks controlled by the government and the cost of 
government storage. Problems occur when the government is required to payout more 
PIK commodity than it owns, as was the case for cotton and rice in 1983 . An attempt 
was made to resolve many of the logistical problems incurred in early PIK programs 
by issuing generic PIK certificates under the 1985 farm program (see Generic PIK). A 
decision that PIK commodities were not subject to the payment limit encouraged 
participation of large-volume producers. In addition, PIK certificates were not subject 
to budget cuts under Gramm-Rudman. 
Consequences: • PIK provi~es an off-budget method for paying producers to divert cropland. 
• PIK reduces government-owned stocks. 
• PIK helps maintain supplies available to the market by releasing CCC stocks while 
curtailing production . 
• Program effectiveness in increasing prices depends on farmer participation, 
slippage, and initial level of stocks. 
• PIK increases the marketable supplies when it is released from CCC stocks or 
loan. 
• Local communities, agribusiness firms, and livestock producers are adversely 
affected by PIK production control programs if sign-up is high. 
• Instead of adjusting excess resources out of crop production in any given year, 
PIKls artificially high prices may actually encourage them to stay. 
24 
Policy Tool: Two-Tier Milk Pricing 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: Two-tier milk pricing plans establish a producer base or quota with a lower price for 
excess production. How much lower the excess price is detennines the effectiveness 
of the plan in controlling production. For effective control, production in excess of the 
base (second tier production) must be priced below variable cost to control production. 
Objective: To control milk production, raise producer returns, and lower government dairy 
program costs. 
When Used: Two-tier pricing plans for milk were proposed and debated throughout most of the 
1980s as a means of bringing milk production in line with consumption but were never 
authorized or implemented. 
• Experience: Not authorized or implemented largely because of disagreement within the industry 
over the desirability of mandatory controls. The Reagan-Bush administrations were 
strongly opposed to mandatory production controls. Beef producer interests realized 
that cutbacks in production meant more cow slaughter and lower beef prices. Thus, 
they were also opposed. 
Consequences: • Milk price could increase if the excess price is high enough . 
• The pricing plan would require strong import controls to be effective. 
• The pricing plan would require close monitoring and control of production . 
• The enhanced returns, as a result of the program, would be capitalized into the 
price of the quota or the value of the dairy. 
• Barriers to entry for new producers would be created by the presence and cost of 
the quota. 
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Policy Tool: 0/92 and 50/92 
Policy Area: Domestic Farm Programs, Supply Control 
What It Is: Participating wheat, feed grain, cotton, and rice producers are allowed to plant less 
than their program payment acreage while continuing to receive deficiency payments 
on 92 percent of their maximum program payment acreage. If wheat and feed grain 
producers plant between 0 and 92 percent of their maximum payment acreage to the 
crop and devote the remaining payment acreage to a conserving use, they are eligible 
to receive deficiency payments on 92 percent of their maximum payment acreage. To 
be eligible for the 92 percent deficiency payment provision, upland cotton and rice 
producers must plant between 50 and 92 percent of their maximum payment acreage to 
the crop and devote the remainder to a conserving use. Minimum deficiency payment 
guarantees are announced for all eligible crops. 
Objective: To reduce the quantity produced and thus the supply of a given commodity while 
protecting farm income. In addition, environmental objectives can be achieved 
through the conserving use requirements on land entered into this program. 
When Used: The 0/92 and 50/92 programs were established for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice 
in the 1985 farm bill. Initially, all eligible crops were subject to the 50/92 provisions. 
Beginning with the 1988 crop, however, wheat and feed grain producers were allowed 
to reduce their planted acreage to zero (0/92). The program was originally designed to 
reduce the substantial stocks that had built up in the mid-1980s. 
Experience: There has been considerable debate on the effectiveness of the 0/92 and 50/92 
programs. As annual acreage reduction requirements declined in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, producers utilized the 0/92 and 50/92 programs more than they had 
previously. This suggests to some that land in the 0/92 and 50/92 programs would not 
be farmed even without the programs. Others see these programs from a lender's 
perspective as a risk reduction tool forced on producers who cannot achieve credit 
levels to farm full production. To the extent that payment limits pose a problem, these 
programs may offer some relief. In any event, the 0/92 and 50/92 programs have 
idled approximately 6.4 percent of the effective base over the 1989-1991 period. 
Consequences: • Removes land from production and thus reduces supply and raises prices. 
. • Removes land from production that, without government support, would otherwise 
be unprofitable. 
• Stabilizes farm income, especially with the guaranteed minimum deficiency 
payment. 
• Reduces lender risk as operating credit needs decline relative to expected revenue. 
• Allows producers to save resources through implementation of conserving use 
practices on idled land. 
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Policy Tool: Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Long-tenn land retirement program specifically targeted to remove highly erodible 
cropland from production. The government pays farmers an annual rental rate and 
shares a portion of the cost of establishing a cover, including trees. (See Long-Tenn 
Land Retirement, Soil Bank in Domestic Farm Programs section.) 
Objective: To reduce erosion, improve water quality, and reduce surplus production. 
Experience: The 1985 farm bill authorized the retirement of 40-45 million acres of highly erodible 
cropland. Highly erodible lands are defined as having thre"e times the level of erosion 
that is considered necessary to sustain production (3n or a minimum of about 15 tons 
per acre annually. By 1992, 35.4 million acres had been enrolled in the program at an 
average annual rental rate of about $49 per acre. The 1990 farm bill extended the 
CRP program to place greater emphasis on retiring land having direct impacts on water 
quality. The CRP is included in the Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve 
Program (ECARP), which is under the Agricultural Resources Conservation Program 
(ARCP) in the 1990 farm bill. The 1990 farm bill provided protection to CRP 
payments from sequestration by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings). The CRP is jointly supported by environmentalists 
and farmers. 
Consequences: • Reduces soil erosion. 
• Improves water quality. 
• Increases wildlife habitat. 
• Reduces crop production. 
• Increases commodity prices. 
• Lowers commodity stocks. 
• Increases commodity price variability. 
• Increases tree acreage. 
• Reduces economic activity in rural communities. 
29 
Policy Tool: Agriculture Conservation Program (ACP), Conservation Technical Assistance 
(CTA), Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: ACP payments up to 3500/year are made to farmers to offset a portion of the costs 
associated with specific farming practices designed, for example, to conserve the soil 
or improve water quality. Related to the ACP program is the Conservation Technical 
Assistance program (CTA), which provides technical assistance to farmers in designing 
conservation and environmental practices such as terracing or contour farming . The 
Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP) has similar objectives and provisions to 
ACP and CTA. 
Objective: To reduce soil erosion and enhance water quality. 
When Used: ACP and CTA have their origin in the Dust Bowl days of the early 1930s, specifically 
1936. While originally enacted to support and expand conservation practices, the ACP 
program was subsequently broadened to encompass output enhancing practices such as 
the application of lime, construction of water tanks, and subsidization of pothole 
drainage programs. This expansion came under fire in the 1970s as unneeded 
subsidies and in the 1990s as being contTal)' to environmental interests such as 
maintaining wetlands and even reducing erosion. These factors , combined with budget 
cuts, resulted in a reorientation of the ACP program back to its original soil 
conservation objectives. 
Consequences: • Reduces soil erosion. 
• Enhances farmland productivity and acreage in crops . 
• Reduces waterfowl and wildlife habitats under the old program. 
• Enhances farm income. 
• Perserves water supplies. 
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Policy Tool: Best Management Practices (BMP) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Fanning method, measure or practice that a producer could be required to implement 
as a matter of regulation or as a condition for receiving fann program benefits . (See 
Conservation Compliance.) 
Objective: To improve the environment by improving water and air quality and reducing soil 
erosion, pesticide use, and animal waste runoff. 
When Used: First authorized by implication in the 1985 fann bill when fanners were required to 
implement conservation compliance plans with a goal of reducing the level of erosion 
to T (the level at which the productivity of the soil is indefinitely maintained). More 
recently, best management practices are proposed to be required under the Clean Water 
Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act (see Conservation Compliance). 
Experience: While BMPs may serve to achieve their desired objectives, fanners and ranchers feel 
that they represent an infringement on their right to fann . Considerable difficulty is 
encountered in specifying best management practices that apply to individual fanning 
conditions. 
Consequences: • Reduces soil erosion. 
• Improves water quality. 
• Reduces fanner/rancher freedom of choice in production. 
• Increases cost of production. 
• Increases food prices. 
• Reduces conflict with environmental interests once they are accepted and practiced. 
• Reduces incentive to participate in fann programs if required as a condition for 
eligibility. 
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Policy Tool: Conservation Compliance and Sodbuster (See Best Management Practices) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Conservation compliance requires that farmers had to develop and file with 
ASCSIUSDA a conservation plan for farming on all highly erodible land by January 1, 
1990, and must fully implement that plan by January I, 1995. Farmers who did not 
file and do not implement satisfactory conservation plans will be ineligible for fann 
program benefits, including deficiency payments, price support loan provisions, and 
disaster payments. In addition, they may not be eligible for new loans from Fanners 
Home Administration or for participation in federal crop insurance, and they may lose 
their CRP payments. Sodbuster discourages bringing highly erosive land into 
production. If this land is brought into production, it must be covered by an approved 
conservation plan or be subject to penalty. 
Objective: To farm highly erodible cropland and reduce the level of soil erosion to T through 
appropriate conservation measures approved by the Soil Conservation Service. T is a 
soil loss tolerance value indicating the maximum level of soil erosion that will pennit 
a crop productivity to be sustained indefinitely. The T requirement can be relaxed 
whenever local SCS/ASCS officials judge that it would cause severe economic 
hardship or be pragmatically impossible to achieve. 
When Used: Enacted as a provision of the 1985 farm bill with the support of environmentalists and 
as a condition for enactment of the bill . 
Experience: Conservation plans were developed in considerable haste after the enactment of the 
1985 farm bill and delayed announcement of complex regulatory procedures. Conflict 
arose in some areas over the farming practices under which T could reasonably be 
achieved, with some resulting relaxation of conservation plan provisions. Since the 
conservation plans were often developed with considerable haste, questions exist over 
whether their provisions can be met realistically. SCS/ASCS will face a major 
decision on the conditions under which conservation plans can be modified and/or 
enforced by January 1, 1995. The 1990 farm bill provides for graduated losses in 
farm program benefits up to $5 ,000 for producers who violated the conservation 
compliance and sodbuster provisions but acted in good faith and had no prior 
violations. 
Consequences: • Reduces soil erosion. 
• Reduces water runoff. 
• Improves water quality. 
• Increases costs of production. 
• Lowers producer returns. 
• Encourages producers to consider long-term land retirement in the CRP. 
• Reduces participation in fann programs. ff pnce and income supports are eliminated, 
conservation compliance provisions could be implemented only with the assistance of ACP 
payments or overt regulation. 
• Eliminates economic incentives for new highly erosive land being brought into production. 
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Policy Tool: Agricultural Water Quality Protection Program (AWQPP) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Three- to five-year voluntary incentive agreement with landowners to implement plans 
to protect water quality. Lands eligible for the program are those associated with 
public w~ter sources, shallow groundwater, and cropland with the potential for 
nonpoint source pollution affecting endangered species habitats and other sensitive 
areas. Participants are paid up to $3,500 per person, per year to implement water 
quality protection plans. Participants may continue to farm the enrolled land, but they 
must report nutrient and pesticide use to the SCS. The 1990 farm bill, which created 
the A WQPP under the Agricultural Resources Conservation Program (ARCP), calls for 
enrolling one million acres in the A WQPP by 1995. 
Objective: To enhance water quality in agricultural areas. 
When Used: First authorized in the 1990 farm bill. 
Experience: Program was not funded in 1991. It was pilot tested in selected counties in the U.S. 
during 1992. 
Consequences: • Preserves/improves water quality. 
• Provides incentives to farmers for nutrient record keeping. 
• Does not reduce crop production. 
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Policy Tool: Environmental Easement Program (EEP) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Long-tenn program to retire cropland presently enrolled in the CRP or WRP, cropland 
containing riparian corridors important for wildlife habitat, or cropland that is 
environmentally sensitive. Participants agree to create and record deed restrictions on 
enrolled land that will pennanently restrict land use to confonn to a natural resource 
conservation management plan on the easement. Payments equal to the loss in value 
of land due to the presence of the easement, up to $250,000 per person, may be made. 
These payments can be made over time but may not exceed $50,000 per person per 
year. Cropland base is pennanently retired. 
Objective: To pennanently remove environmentally sensitive cropland from production. 
When Used: First authorized in the 1990 fann bill. 
Experience: Too early to tell. 
Consequences: • Preserves wetlands. 
• Preserves grasslands created by the CRP. 
• Protects water quality in agricultural areas. 
• Protects habitats for endangered species. 
• Reduces crop production. 
• Increases price and price variability for commodities if widely adopted. 
• Reduces value of land enrolled in the program. 
• Reduces producer flexibility for land enrolled. 
34 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: No net loss specifies that if an individual decides to convert wetlands to fanning or 
development, the same acreage must be replaced as wetlands elsewhere. (See 
Swampbuster. ) 
Objective: To discourage the reduction of wetland areas and acreages. 
When Used: First established as a national goal by President Bush in 1990 budget message to the 
Congress. Implemented in the swampbuster provisions of the 1990 fann bill. 
Experience: Reduced wetland conversion. Questions have arisen from environmental interests 
whether the quality of restored wetlands is the same as originally existed. 
Consequences: • Discourages wetlands from being brought into production. 
• Conserves land and water resources. 
• Retards increases in production. 
• Restricts increases in the supply of cropland; thus supporting prices of land in 
production. 
• Reduces current values of affected land that could be brought into crop production. 
• Improves water quality and habitat for fish, shellfish, and wildlife. 
• Allows fanners some opportunity to adjust operation by draining one area and 
restoring another. 
35 
Policy Tool: Swampbuster 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Swampbuster denies farm program benefits for wetlands brought into production. 
Converting a wetland to make production possible invokes loss of farm program 
benefits that cannot be restored until the converted wetland is restored. Conversion of 
a wetland can occur by draining, tilling, or simply planting an agricultural crop in a 
designated wetland. A minimal effect clause exempts conversions when minimal 
effects are determined on the hydrological or biological properties of the wetland. 
This clause also allows wetland restoration to mitigate a wetland loss -- applying the 
no net loss concept. Graduated penalties in the form of lost program benefits of up to 
$10,000 exist for violations, with a good faith restoration allowed on the first violation. 
(See No Net Loss.) 
Objective: To discourage the conversion of wetlands and implement a no net loss policy. 
When Used: Enacted originally as a provision of the 1985 farm bill with the support of both 
environmentalists and farm organizations. The 1985 farm bill contained a so-called 
"drop dead" provision which meant a loss of all farm program benefits on the whole 
farm for a small wetland conversion. The 1990 farm bill instead implemented the 
graduated penalty structure with the good faith restoration clause. 
Experience: Appears to have brought a halt to clearing and draining of fragile lands by producers 
who currently participate in the farm program. 
Consequences: • Discourages wetlands from being brought into production. 
• Conserves land and water resources. 
• Retards increases in production. 
• Restricts increases in the supply of cropland, thus supporting prices of land in 
production. 
• Reduces current values of affected land that could be brought into crop production 
through drainage . 
• Improves water quality and habitat for fish, shellfish, and wildlife. 
• Allows farmers some opportunity to adjust operation by draining one area and 
restoring another. 
36 
Policy Tool: Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) 
Policy Area: Conservation and Environment 
What It Is: Pennanent or 30-year easement for lands restored by farmers and ranchers to wetland 
status or to prevent the conversion of existing wetlands. Like CRP, participants are 
paid an annual rental rate per acre over a period of 5 to 20 years. The goal of the 
program is to enroll one million acres by 1995. The WRP is a title under the 
Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP), which is part of the 
Agricultural Resources Conservation Program (ARCP) in the 1990 farm bill. Land 
enrolled in the WRP must forfeit its existing cropland base and allotment history. 
Objective: To expand and preserve wetland acreage. 
When Used: First authorized in the 1990 farm bill. 
Experience: Too early to tell. 
Consequences: • Preserves wetlands. 
• Improves water quality. 
• Retains farmer's freedom to enter the program. 
• Increases habitat for fish, wildlife, and waterfowl. 
• Reduces production to the extent that existing cropland is enrolled in the program. 
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Policy Tool: Cargo Preference 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: Cargo preference refers to the provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 
which requires that a portion of cargoes procured, furnished, or financed by the 
United States be transported in U.S. ships. Under previous law, 75 percent of 
government-sponsored exports had to be shipped on U.S. flag vessels. The 1990 fann 
bill requires that 50 percent of P.L.-480 commodities be shipped on a lowest-landed 
cost basis, regardless of country of registry of the vessels. Other provisions allow 
shipments on specifically designated American Great Lakes Vessels to be counted 
toward cargo preference requirements. Further, Great Lakes ports may be allocated a 
maximum of P.L.-480 shipments made in 1984. If shipments to Great Lakes ports 
must be shifted to non-Great Lakes ports to comply with cargo preference, the CCC 
must compensate the Great Lakes ports for the loss of business. 
Objective: To assure a minimum volume of business to the U.S. maritime industry. 
When Used: Cargo preference requirements have been an important factor in U.S. agricultural 
exports since the enactment of P.L.-480 in 1954. 
Experience: Cargo preference has had a major impact on agricultural food aid programs of 
P.L.-480. Transporting commodities aboard U.S. vessels costs between 1.5 to 2.5 
times more than for foreign vessels. This increal)ed cost is paid for out of USDA 
funding for P.L.-480. In 1985, a federal court ruling that cargo preference also 
applied to USDA blended credit programs resulted in suspension of the program 
because the increased transport cost made the program no longer cost effective. 
Consequences: • U.S. food aid programs will likely increase volumes delivered due to the lowest-
landed cost provisions of the 1990 farm bill. 
• U.S. agricultural exports have been less competitive in some markets due to 
curtailment of certain credit programs as a result of increased transport costs. 
• U.S. maritime industry and selected U.S. ports receive subsidies and compensation, 
thereby increasing the costs of administering food aid programs. 
41 
Policy Tool: Import License 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: A government-issued right to import a specified quantity of a product or 
commodity. 
Objective: Since import quotas limit the amount of a good imported, licenses may be used to 
allocate the limited supply of imports among domestic importers, as well as to limit 
the total quantity that can be imported. 
When Used: Even though tariffs have been lowered through GAIT, quantitative restrictions such as 
quotas have become more prevalent methods of limiting agricultural trade. Import 
licenses are used by some countries to allocate the rights to import certain goods and 
to limit the quantity imported. 
Experience: The United States has issued import licenses for a stipulated quantity of imports to 
domestic importers of dairy products, sugar, and beef based on their historical share of 
the market. Mexico, for example, has implemented licensing systems for com, barley, 
milk powder, and cheese. Import licenses were utilized for approximately 25 percent 
of all U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico in 1991. If a North American Free Trade 
Agreement is implemented, import licenses would be converted to tariff-rate quotas 
(see Tariff-Rate Quotas). 
Consequences: • Can limit the quantity available within the import market, raising consumer and 
producer prices. 
• Creates additional market instability because of the often arbitrary nature of issuing 
licenses. 
• Discriminates at times against new importers since no historical basis for importing 
exists, making access to markets difficult or virtually impossible. 
• Eliminates imported supplies if the importing government fails to allocate licenses. 
• Invites possible retaliation by foreign trading partners wishing to export larger 
volumes to the protected import market. 
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Policy Tool: Import Quotas 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: Import quotas limit the quantity of a specific commodity that has been imported. 
Limits are generally allocated among potential exporting countries. Specific limits are 
frequently negotiated to avoid more restrictive voluntary or mandatory limits. The 
specific size of quotas may be either legislated, negotiated, or determined by executive 
action. Those determined by executive action under Section 22, which imposes quotas 
or fees on imports that interfere with operation of a price support program, are 
recommended by the International Trade Commission and imposed by the President. 
(See Section 22.) 
Objective: To protect U.S. producers and/or price support programs from foreign competition by 
establishing a maximum quantity of specific commodities that can be imported. 
When Used: Beef import quotas have been mandated by the Congress. Cheese import quotas, 
which were imposed to protect the price support program, have been the subject of 
negotiation and agreement under GAIT. Import quotas are also imposed on 
sugar and related products. Quotas exist on textile imports as a means of 
avoiding harm to the domestic textile industry. 
Experience: The imposition of import quotas is highly political. Even though the 
International Trade Commission recommendations to the President are based on 
objective criteria, the ultimate Presidential decision is highly political. The 
existence of U.S. import quotas has made it difficult to get other countries to 
reduce trade barriers . Japan argues that its rice import quotas are no different 
from the import quotas imposed by the United States. 
Consequences: • Import quotas restrict available supplies and raise domestic prices. 
• Textile import restrictions reduce export demand for U.S. cotton lint but may 
increase sales to domestic mills. Less overall demand is likely because of 
higher ultimate consumer product prices. 
• Without import quotas on price-supported commodities, the CCC would 
acquire a larger quantity of commodities under the price support program. 
• Import quotas result in windfall profits to licensed importers. 
• Supply control aspects of import quotas result in greater price fluctuations than 
might occur in a free market. 
• Efficiency of production plays no role in determining competitiveness under a 
system of quotas. 
• Retaliation for non-agricultural commodity quotas can lead to reduction in 
agricultural exports from the United States. 
• Import quotas established by large importing countries (European Community, 
United States, Japan) tend to depress world prices. 
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Policy Tool: Import Tariffs, Countervailing Duties 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: Import tariffs are a tax or duty on commodities entering the United States. A 
countervailing duty is a tariff that offsets an export subsidy of another country. 
A tariff may be either a fixed charge per unit of product imported (specific 
tariff) or a percentage of the value of the product imported (ad valorem tariff). 
The specific size of the tariff may be legislated, negotiated, or determined by 
executive action. The size of the countervailing duty is designed to offset exactly 
the size of the export subsidy of a competing country. 
Objective: To restrict imports of certain commodities. 
When Used: Because of the emphasis of GAIT on reducing tariff trade barriers, the importance of 
tariffs has gradually decreased. Substantial tariffs still exist, however, on a number of 
specialty commodities. The authority exists for the imposition of countervailing duties 
equal to the amount of export subsidies provided by other countries. Such 
countervailing duties are generally limited to those instances in which there is a 
reasonable indication that an industry in the United States is being materially injured 
or threatened with injury because of subsidized imports. Antidumping duties may also 
be imposed if a commodity is sold in the United States at less than fair value in the 
event of a finding of material injury. Countervailing duty and antidumping duty 
actions involve determinations by both the International Trade Commission and the 
Department of Commerce. While tariffs were often used in the past to generate 
revenue, this is no longer the case. 
Experience: The visibility of tariffs and GAIT emphasis on reducing tariff trade barriers have 
fostered the use of nontariff barriers to trade. Tariff barriers are less effective in 
reducing trade because they do not constitute an absolute limit on quantities that 
can be imported. That is, while efficiency plays no role in import quotas, tariffs 
potentially continue to reward efficiency. There has been a hesitancy to utilize 
countervailing duties because of the potential for precipitating trade wars. 
Consequences: • Tariffs raise the effective price of goods entering the United States and thereby 
reduce the comparative advantage of foreign-produced goods. 
• Tariffs reduce the volume of commodities imported at all price levels. 
• Economists regard tariffs as a lesser evil than quotas or other nontariff barriers 
because efficient producers may still be able to obtain access to the market with a tariff. 
• Countervailing or antidumping duties offset export subsidy practices of other 
countries and thereby protect U.S. producers. 
• The U.S. Treasurj receives the revenue from a tariff. 
• The absolute level of price fluctuation is the same, or nearly the same, with a 
tariff as in the free market. Price changes are reflected to consumers. 
• Import tariffs may result in retaliation by trading partners. 
• On tariff regulated commodities, consumers in the importing country pay 
higher prices than in the absence of tariffs. 
• Import tariffs established by large importing countries (European Community, 
United States, Japan) tend to depress world prices. 
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Policy Tool: Nontariff Trade Barrier 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: Nontariff trade barriers, strictly speaking, cover all restrictions on imports other than 
tariffs. Thus, quotas are nontariff trade barriers. Likewise, the variable levy (tariff) 
employed by the EC in CAP is a nontariff trade barrier. (For a discussion of these 
pol~cy tools, see Import Quotas and Variable Levy.) The nontariff barriers discussed 
here include a wide array of devices such as health and sanitation, packaging, and 
labeling regulations, as well as foreign exchange restrictions. 
Objective: To restrict imports of individual commodities. 
When Used: The use of nontariff trade barriers has increased, in part, because of the GAIT 
emphasis on reducing tariff trade barriers. Common U.S. nontariff restrictions relate to 
health and sanitation restrictions on animal and plant products such as the prohibition 
of meat imports from countries having foot and mouth disease. Sometimes such 
restrictions are justified while, at other times, they are purely protectionist. 
Experience: Nontariff trade barriers are generally more restrictive than tariff barriers because they 
may constitute absolute barriers to trade. Nontariff barriers have had a tendency to 
proliferate in recent years. Nontariff barriers have been used to reduce the 
competitiveness of foreign producers who are able to use pesticides and other products 
that are banned in the United States. 
Consequences: • Nontariff trade barriers restrict available supplies and raise domestic prices. 
• Nontariff trade barriers may be an absolute barrier to trade with efficiency playing 
no role in determining competitiveness. 
• The imposition of a nontariff barrier may increase the degree of price variability. 
• Nontariff trade barriers increase the risk faced by importing firms. 
• Nontariff trade barriers may result in retaliation by trading partners. 
• Nontariff trade barriers may assure standardization and product quality of imported 
goods. 
• Nontariff trade barriers tend to depress world prices when used by large importing 
countries. 
• Nontariff trade barriers like health regulators restrict trade as a side effect of the 
major objective of protecting public health (e.g., ban on imports of beef from 
countries with hoof and mouth disease) . However, such health regulations can be 
used to explicitly restrict trade (e.g., EC ban on beef with hormones.) 
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Policy Tool: Section 22 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 authorizes the President of 
the United States to impose import quotas or fees if it is determined that imports will 
interfere .with federal price support programs or substantially reduce U.S. production of 
products processed from farm commodities (see Import Quotas). 
Objective: To protect the integrity of domestic price support programs and domestic markets for 
farm commodities. 
When Used: Section 22 requires the International Trade Commission, on direction by the 
President, to investigate the potential for imports to render ineffective or interfere with 
the operation of U.S. farm support programs. The President may impose import fees 
not to exceed 5 percent ad valorem or implement an import quota to reduce imports of 
a particular commodity to no less than 50 percent that of a representative time period. 
Special emergency authority allows the President to take immediate action to restrict 
imports of perishable commodities without waiting for a ruling by the International 
Trade Commission. 
Experience: Action under Section 22 is initiated by the Foreign Agricultural Service-USDA. 
Since 1951, 51 investigations have been conducted by the International Trade 
Commission. Most of these were related to cotton and wheat, ice cream and cheese, 
and cotton-comber waste. The U.S. was granted a waiver of the GAIT prohibition 
against import restrictions in 1955. Since first used in 1935, Section 22 has been 
imposed on 12 commodity groups: wheat and flour; rye, rye flour and meal; barley; 
oats; cotton; dairy products; almonds; filberts; peanuts and oil; tung nuts and oil; 
flaxseed and linseed oil; sugars and syrups. Section 22 is currently used to restrict 
imports o{ cotton, peanuts, dairy, and sugars and syrups. The first three commodities 
are restricted by import quota, while sugar imports are controlled by a combination of 
tariff and quota. In the current GAIT round, the United States has offered to suspend 
and terminate Section 22 protection as part of its effort to eliminate trade distortions in 
agriculture. 
Consequences: • Import restrictions reduce available supplies on the market and raise domestic prices of 
protected commodities. 
• Consumer prices for some food and fiber products are higher because of import controls 
imposed under Section 22. Recent estimates indicate that U.S. consumers pay $1 to $2 
billion annually in higher sugar costs due to import quotas. 
• Without Section 22 protection, CCC commodity acquisition costs would be much greater in 
some years. 
• Import quotas invite GAIT complaints and trade retaliation by other countries. 
• World prices for protected commodities are lower than they would be without Section 22. 
• Resource allocation and use are distorted due to import controls. 
• Price instability is increased due to the imposition of import quotas and tariff restrictions. 
• Large profits accrue to holders of import quotas: 
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Policy Tool: Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: Tariff-rate quotas apply a higher tariff rate to imported goods after a certain 
quantitative limit has been achieved during a specified period. A negotiated rate is 
applied to imports up to a quota limit. Subsequently, a much higher duty is applied. 
The TRQ is the "tariffication" method used in GAIT and NAFfA to convert nontariff 
barriers, such as quotas or licenses, to tariffs. 
Objective: To protect domestic producers and U.S. farm program integrity from import 
competition during transition periods from a protected market to more open market 
conditions. TRQs do not iimit the quantity of goods that may be imported. 
When Used: When converting a restrictive quota to a tariff for purposes of transition to freer trade. 
Experience: The U.S. sugar quota system was replaced by a TRQ in 1990. The previous quota 
was found in violation of GAIT rules after a complaint by Australia. The TRQ 
imposes a zero or nominal duty on raw sugar imports up to a given amount and a 
higher duty on imports above the quota, 1.4 million metric tons in Fiscal Year 1992. 
TRQs are the primary means of converting U.S. quotas imposed under Section 22 to 
tariffs as a transition mechanism in GAIT and NAFfA negotiations. 
Consequences: • Raises domestic prices over free trade but does not restrict available supplies. 
• Reduces export demand and lowers world prices if the importing country is large. 
• Allows market forces to more efficiently allocate resources since TRQs are less 
restrictive than a quota. 
• Requires lower CCC costs of acquisition and storage than under free market since 
imports are somewhat lower. 
• Provides more market stability than arbitrarily imposed import quotas or licenses. 
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Policy Tool: Variable Levy 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: A minimum price is set at which a commodity can be imported. If the import 
price falls below that minimum price, a levy or import tax is imposed equal to 
the difference between the world price and the import price. A variable levy is 
classified as a nontariff trade barrier because the size of the levy (or tariff) is not 
fixed in either absolute or percentage terms. 
Objective: To limit importation of specific commodities. 
When Used: The variable levy is the principal mechanism used by the EC to restrict agricultural 
imports. Under CAP, the EC farmers are guaranteed grain prices greater than the world 
price. An import levy equal to the difference between the EC producer price and the 
price of grain landed in Rotterdam must be paid on imported grain. The variable levy 
on grains changes daily. 
Experience: The variable levy is an effective barrier to trade because it eliminates the 
economic (price) advantage of the imported commodity. Efforts to negotiate a 
l~ss restrictive EC agricultural policy have failed because the variable levy is the 
very basis of CAP. Getting rid of the variable levy would mean that the EC 
would have to develop a whole new agricultural policy approach. 
Consequences: • A variable levy effectively reduces imports and thus raises domestic prices to a 
predetermined level. 
• Efficiency plays no role in determining competitiveness under a variable levy 
policy. 
• When the world price is below the predetermined minimum price, the variable levy 
constitutes a source of revenue to the importing country. 
• The variable levy ensures a stable internal price while increasing instability in 
world markets. 
• The variable levy, along with high internal support prices, transformed the EC 
from a net grain importer into a net grain exporter. 
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Policy Tool: Voluntary Export Restraint 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Domestic Industry Protection 
What It Is: An agreement whereby foreign governments are asked to limit exports of specific 
commodities to a given quantity. The agreements are often negotiated under 
duress because of the potential enactment of formal import restrictions. 
Objective: To control the importation of certain commodities and thereby protect domestic 
producers. 
When Used: In the United States, voluntary export restraints are used in conjunction with the 
Meat Import Act of 1979. Whenever USDA estimates of meat imports appear 
likely to exceed 11 0 percent of the adjusted base quantity, the U.S. government 
has negotiated voluntary restraints rather than impose and administer formal 
import quotas. 
Experience: The voluntary export restraint mechanism has served as a useful adjunct to 
formal import quotas authorized by the Meat Import Act. 
Consequences: • Voluntary export restraints restrict available supplies and raise domestic prices. 
• As a result of voluntary export restraints, price fluctuations are greater in world 
markets than they would be in a free market environment. 
• Voluntary export restraints erode the importance of efficiency of production in 
determining competitiveness. 
• Income derived from holding import license or quota is transferred to the 
exporting country. 
• Some countries may be left out of the market because they refuse to limit their 
imports. 
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Policy Tool: Barter/Counter Trade 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
What It Is: Barter is trade among two or more countries or finns involving the exchange of 
goods and/or services of equal value instead of currency or credit transactions as 
payment,for a commodity. 
Objective: To facilitate trade with developing countries experiencing short-run financial 
difficulties and to obtain sources of strategic raw materials that might not 
otherwise be available. 
When Used: The exchange of powdered milk to Jamaica for bauxite in 1982 was the first U.S. 
barter negotiation in 15 years. The 1985 fann bill required the Secretary of 
Agriculture to establish and carry out at least two pilot barter programs by 1987. 
Agricultural commodities were bartered for designated strategic materials. The 1990 
fann bill specifies certain CCC commodities eligible for barter transactions. 
Experience: Barter has a limited ability to expand exports. Rather, it is more of a temporary 
measure to maintain an existing market during periods of adverse economic 
conditions. Its greatest potential appears to be as a market development tool for 
developing countries with mineral or strategic metals of importance to the U.S. 
defense and industrial sectors. The biggest problem in barter is matching needs 
with products. 
Consequences: • Barter helps maintain export levels. 
• Barter provides increased potential for developing commercial markets for 
agricultural products. 
• Barter has limited applicability because of the required coincidence of needs. 
• Barte~' may displace commercial sales. 
• Barter value generally approximates relative world market value of the 
commodities being traded. 
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Policy Tool: International Commodity Agreements 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
What It Is: An international commodity agreement is a multilateral agreement among countries to 
affect the terms of trade. The terms of trade affected by an international commodity 
agreement may include the price level, quantity sold, quantity produced, or quantity 
held in reserve. Legally, commodity agreements are treaties among the participating 
nations. 
Objective: To raise the world price above equilibrium levels, to stabilize price, and to provide 
increased supply assurance. 
When Used: Commodity agreements, which were first established in 1949, have been used most 
extensively on wheat, cocoa, coffee, tea, and sugar. Currently, they are used 
extensively among developing countries. OPEC might also be looked upon as an 
international commodity agreement. The International Coffee Agreement expired in 
1991 and has not been renewed. 
Experience: Commodity agreements have had a reasonably good history of stabilizing prices as 
long as burdensome surpluses or shortages do not exist. Commodity agreements 
designed to raise prices have a tendency to fall apart because of a lack of control over 
production. Recent years have witnessed the demise of agreements in tin and coffee, 
due mainly to oversupply and low prices. To be effective, commodity agreements 
require close coordination of domestic farm programs to coordinate closely with the 
activities of international commodity agreements . 
Consequences: • Commodity agreements provide increased price stability. 
• Domestic prices are raised by commodity agreements. 
• Exchange of information among countries on market conditions is increased. 
• When prices are raised, excess supplies frequently accumulate unless effective 
supply control mechanisms are included. 
• Unless commodity agreements are well coordinated with the domestic farm 
programs of the participating countries, they tend to break down. 
• As with any international trade agreement, enforcement is virtually impossible. 
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Policy Tool: Long-Term Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Agreements 
What It Is: A long-tenn bilateral trade agreement is a contract between two countries 
specifying the quantity of a commodity to be traded over a certain time period. 
Bilateral trade agreements nonnally run for a period of three to five years, although 
they may be simple one-year agreements that are renewed annually. The 
agreements nonnally specify the minimum quantity to be purchased and the 
maximum quantity to be supplied. Generally, no provisions exist with regard to 
the price to be paid. 
Objective: To assure the importing country a minimum supply and the exporting country a 
market for its production ~ and to nonnalize trade, develop markets, and retain 
markets for farm products. 
When Used: Trade agreements have become increasingly common since a world food shortage 
was experienced in the early 1970s. The most publicized agreement was the 
five-year contract negotiated with the Soviets in 1975. It contained provisions that 
the Soviets would purchase a minimum of 6 million metric tons of grain, with the 
option for an additional 2 million tons . In the early 1980s, the United States became 
cool to the trade agreement concept while Australia and Canada signed agreements 
with several countries including the Soviet Union and China. In 1991, the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union entered a new five-year agreement specifying that a minimum of 8 
million metric tons and a maximum of 14 million metric tons would be purchased 
each year for five years . The U.S. also has had agreements with China, Egypt, and 
Taiwan. 
Experience: Trade agreements are a means of opening a new market and maintaining a 
competiti ve position. The quantities specified in the agreement have generally been 
less than the nonnal trading levels. With recent developments in the fonner Soviet 
Union, it is doubtful that agreed-to minimums will be met in some years . 
Enforcement of minimum purchases also has been a problem under previous 
agreements due to increased production, high world supplies, and retaliation for non-
agricultural trade related disputes. 
Consequences: • The total annual volume of trade tends to be increased and stabilized between the 
parties to the agreement. 
• Importing countries outside the agreement may be denied a source of the 
commodity if supplies become short. 
• Exporting countries outside the agreement may be denied market outlets 
when supplies are plentiful. 
• Trade agreements are, in essence, barriers to trade in that they tie up markets 
over long time periods. 
• Trade agreements cause greater fluctuations in world prices because they 
effectively reduce the world supply that can be traded competitively. 
• Trade agreements are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce and may lead to 
false market expectations. 
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Policy Tool: Contract Sanctity 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Embargoes 
What It Is: Sanctity of contracts provides that exporters will be able to fulfill their contract 
obligations for a period of 270 days after the imposition of any embargo. 
Sanctity .of contract provisions was included as an amendment to the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Bill in 1983. 
Objective: To assure importing countries the United States is a dependable supplier and to 
reduce the impact of export embargoes on exporting firms and producers. 
When Used: After lifting the Soviet grain embargo in April 1981, producer organizations and 
exporting firms applied increasing pressure on the Reagan administration for 
sanctity of contracts. In 1982, President Reagan provided assurance that he would 
allow increased purchases by the Soviets with sanctity of contracts. This principle 
was written into law in early 1983 and applies to all agricultural export sales. 
This assurance is continued in the 1985 and 1990 farm bills. 
Experience: The abrupt imposition of the Russian grain embargo in January 1980 left U.S. 
producers and exporters with delivery commitments that were disallowed. While 
the U.S. government provided compensation to exporters for losses incurred, 
long-term injury ensued to the reputation of the United States as a reliable 
agricultural exporter. This was one of several factors leading to a decline in the 
U.S. share of total world trade in the early 1980s. 
Consequences: • The United States is viewed as a more reliable supplier of agricultural exports. 
• Importers know that when they sign a contract for delivery of U.S. agricultural 
products, there will not be governmental interference with performance on it. 
• Exporters are assured their sales will be allowed. 
• Producers are shielded from the immediate effects of embargoes. 
• Producers should receive higher prices because exporters do not have to discount 
for the uncertainty posed by a potential embargo. 
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Policy Tool: Export Embargoes 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Embargoes 
What It Is: Export embargoes set absolute limits on quantities that can be exported. Partial 
embargoes may allow only a certain quantity to be exported after which 
permission must be obtained from the exporting country. 
Objective: To hold down commodity prices in the exporting country prevent domestic shortages 
of commodities, and achieve a foreign policy objective. 
When Used: Export embargoes have been imposed three times since 1970: 
(1) In 1973 an embargo was placed on the export of soybeans to provide 
assurance that poultry and hog producers would have a sufficient lower cost 
supply of soybean meal. 
(2) In 1975 an embargo was placed on exports of grain sales to the Soviet Union 
after concern about increasing food prices. 
(3) In January 1980 an embargo was placed on all exports to the Soviet Union 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent tensions in 
Poland. This embargo was not lifted until April 1981. 
Provisions of the 1990 farm bill continue protection for agricultural producers against 
the imposition of export embargoes by assuring the sanctity of export contracts 
negotiated prior to any embargo. 
Experience: Embargoes, or the threat of embargoes, have been a major factor in reduced 
confidence in the United States as a dependable supplier. Therefore, embargoes may 
have contributed to the decline in the U.S. share of world agricultural trade. Serious 
questions also exist concerning the effectiveness of embargoes as a policy tool. 
Consequences: • Embargoes reduce U.S. export sales and lower prices. 
• Embargoes reduce confidence in the United States as a dependable supplier, 
thus encouraging foreign buyers to cultivate other sources of supply. 
• Embargoes encourage other countries to increase production as a means of 
achieving self-sufficiency. 
• Embargoes encourage competing exporting countries to increase production. 
• It is difficult to prevent the intended embargoed country from importing the 
commodity from another source. 
• The mere potential for embargoes is reflected in the market place as exporters 
and importers adjust for this uncertainty. 
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Policy Tool: Blended Credit 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: Blended credit is a non-price fom} of export subsidy that combines direct 
government export credit and credit guarantees in a single package to reduce the 
effective, interest rate. Government export credit is provided in a program 
known as GSM-5. The credit guarantee program is known as GSM-I02. 
Objective: To make U.S. credit terms competitive with those offered by other exporting 
countries. 
When Used: Blended credit is available only when appropriations are provided by the Congress. 
Tight budgets have made blended credit available only to a limited number of 
countries and commodities. Countries were selected based on magnitude of surpluses 
and competitive need, as well as diplomatic and domestic political considerations. The 
blended credit program was most recently initiated in October 1982 but has not been 
used since 1985 because of budget considerations and complaints in GAIT. 
Experience: During the period used, blended credit facilitated the opening of markets for U.S. 
commodities in competition with other countries. It is particularly useful for markets 
in developing countries where credit and credit guarantees are critical. 
Consequences: • The United States is made more competitive in the face of other countries' 
subsidized export credit programs. 
• A basis is provided for penetrating new export markets, particularly in 
developing country markets. 
• Compared to other forms of export subsidies, blended credit runs less risk of 
creating retaliatory trade war conditions. 
• Expansion of subsidized credit encourages other countries to expand their 
export subsidy programs, thus creating the potential for increased treasury cost 
over time. 
• If successful in expanding exports, blended credit raises prices in the United 
States, thus raising domestic food costs and production costs for livestock 
producers. 
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Policy Tool: Direct Export Credit 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: Direct export credit refers to the CCC GSM-5 program that provides financing 
for U.S. agricultural exports with tenns up to 36 months. 
Objective: To provide financing to countries and/or foreign buyers who would otherwise be 
unable to secure the necessary credit to purchase U.S. agricultural commodities. 
When Used: The GSM-5 program was used extensively through the period 1956-1979. Since the 
beginning of the GSM-I02 credit guarantee program in 1980, less focus has been 
placed on the direct credit program. In the 1985 fann bill, no funds were authorized 
for the GSM-5 program. 
Experience: Since 1956, the GSM-5 program has been responsible for the export sales of between 
$1.4 billion to $1.6 billion annually of U.S. agricultural commodities. Beginning with 
the GSM-I02 credit guarantee program in 1980, the GSM-5 program declined in 
importance. In 1985, $325 million was authorized for GSM-5 while $5 billion went to 
GSM-I02. For 1986 and beyond, no funding was allocated for GSM-5 in the 1985 or 
1990 fann bills. As a result, those sales that would have been made as a result of 
GSM-5 will be lost. 
Consequences: • U.S. markets in countries with severe debt problems have been maintained. 
• Government costs are higher than they would be without program funding. 
• Direct credit programs are needed to compete with similar programs 
offered by other exporting countries. 
• Direct credit programs provide a basis for expanding markets in developing 
countries. 
• If credit sales expand total exports, domestic food costs and livestock 
production costs are greater than they would be without the programs. 
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Policy Tool: Export Credit Guarantees 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: Export credit guarantees are U.S. government assurances for U.S. banks that 
provide financing for foreign buyers to purchase U.S. agricultural products. The 
CCC insures up to 98 percent of the free on board (f.o.b.) value of an export 
sale in the event that a foreign bank or government fails, for any reason, to make 
payment under a letter of credit agreement. 
Objective: To assist U.S. exporters in making sales they would not make otherwise and to 
compete with export enhancement programs provided by other exporters. 
When Used: Export credit guarantees were introduced in 1979 and have been an integral part of 
U.S. agricultural trade policy ever since. The 1990 fann bill continues authorization 
for the GSM-I02 program with credit terms up to 3 years. It further provides funding 
for an intermediate credit program, GSM-301, which offers credit terms of 3 to 10 
years and includes financing for infrastructure development. 
Experience: Both GSM-I02 and GSM-I03 credit guarantee programs are currently in operation. 
They have been successful in maintaining U.S. sales to countries with severe debt 
problems. This success has occurred only through continued increase in federal 
appropriations, from $671 million in 1980 to authorization for up to $5 billion 
annually through 1995. Defaults under either program have been minimal, with Iraq 
being the most recent example. Over $2 billion in export credit guaranteed loans have 
been made to former USSR republics. 
Consequences: • U.S. agricultural exports declined less than they would have in the absence 
of such programs. 
• Export credit guarantees promote long-term development of markets. 
• U.S. exporters are more competitive with programs of other exporters. 
• Export credit guarantees are less obvious than other export subsidies and less 
likely to produce retaliation from other exporters. 
• Export credit guarantees decrease government direct credit budget exposure. 
• Export credit guarantees allow U.S. banks to make loans that would not be 
financially prudent under ordinary circumstances. 
• Export credit guarantees may expose the U.S. government to large liabilities in 
the event of major defaults by foreign purchasers. 
• Extensive use of export credit invites retaliation by other major exporters. 
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Policy Tool: Export PIK, Bonus Incentive Commodity Export Program (BICEP) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: Under export PIK, the government provides an in-kind export commodity bonus 
for each regular commercial purchase of a specified amount. For example, if a 
country purchases 1 million metric tons of wheat, it might receive an additional 
100,000 "metric tons of PIK wheat from CCC stocks. The 100,000 metric ton 
bonus is the export PIK. 
Objective: To make the United States commodity price competitive in the world market and 
thus expand export markets. 
When Used: Export PIK was first used in a 1983 flour sale to Egypt. The 1985 farm bill 
contained provisions for export PIK to support both targeted export assistance 
programs and export market enhancement programs. In general, the use of 
export PIK has been limited to surplus commodities held in CCC inventories . 
Experience: Export PIK was used to capture the 1983 Egyptian flour market for the 
United States. Other flour exporting countries, such as France, were upset, 
although no overt retaliatory steps were taken against the United States. The 1990 
farm bill created the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) that replaced BICEP. EEP 
continues to use export bonuses, in cash or in-kind, to regain and maintain U.S . 
markets lost to unfair export competition, primarily from the European Community 
(see Export Enhancement Program). 
Consequences: • Improved the United States competitive position in the world market, despite 
reduced demand and loan rates that were above world market clearing levels. 
• In-kind export PIK was less overt than direct monetary export subsidies and thus 
not as likely"to invite either retaliation or GAIT sanction. 
• Government stocks of commodities can be lowered. 
• An export alternative is provided by export PIK as long as the CCC owns 
sufficient stocks. 
• Export PIK may be a violation of at least the spirit of GAIT. 
• Widespread use of export PIK has invited public scrutiny of many export 
promotion programs and may threaten to undennine U.S. efforts for trade refonn 
in the GAIT negotiations. 
• Commercial sales may be offset by bonus commodities . 
• Increased demand for export PIK subsidized commodities places upward price 
pressure on domestic consumers. 
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Policy Tool: Monetary Export Subsidies 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: Monetary subsidies to exporters in dollars per unit of commodity sold. 
Objective: To make the U.S. commodity price competitive in the world market and thus 
expand markets. 
When Used: Export subsidies can be used to export agricultural commodities when U.S. price 
supports are above world prices. Overt monetary subsidies of exports are seldom 
made because they clearly violate the provisions of GAIT. Under those provisions, 
the United States could be required to pay damages to the countries injured by such 
subsidies. EC subsidies do not violate GAIT because they were in place as a part of 
CAP at the time GAIT was negotiated. The last major U.S. direct monetary export 
subsidy was in the 1972 Russian grain deal when a subsidy of approximately $0.60 per 
bushel of wheat was provided. The marketing loan program authorized for cotton and 
rice in the 1990 farm bill is similar to an export subsidy (see Marketing Loan in 
Domestic Policy section). Political considerations are obviously involved in the use of 
export subsidies. 
Experience: Export subsidies are overt methods of subsidizing exports. As such, they are 
readily determined to be in violation of GAIT and invite retaliation from 
competitors if they increase U.S . market share. 
Consequences: • The effective export price is lowered to make U.S. commodity prices 
competitive in the world market. The result is to expand exports. 
• Domestic farm prices may be increased. 
• Monetary subsidies run a high risk of inviting retaliation. 
• Monetary subsidies violate GAIT. 
• Stocks are reduced as a result of increased exports and price variability increases. 
• Long-run price relief is provided for U.S. producers in the face of low world 
pnces. 
• Monetary subsidies can be expensive in terms of both money and image. 
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Policy Tool: Public Law (P.L.) 480, Food for Peace 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: P.L.-480 provides for concessional sales of commodities that contain substantial U.S. 
subsidies. Exports are made under three P.L.-480 programs: 
• Title I involves sales for dollars under low interest rates from 10-30 years 
repayment. 
• Title II involves emergency food relief directed to nutritionally vulnerable nations. 
• Title III involves commodity aid as part of a development package. 
Multiyear commitments are tied to specific development actions. 
Objective: To dispose of surplus commodities, develop markets, provide emergency food 
aid, and assist friendly nations in development. 
When Used: Authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954, P.L.-480 was 
used to export as much as one-third of the export sales during the 1950s and 
1960s when loan rates were maintained above world prices. Since then, 
P.L.-480 sales have generally been in the $1 to $2 billion range. Countries are 
selected for assistance based on diplomatic and political considerations as well as 
need. Commodities selected are influenced by the magnitude of surplus stocks. 
The SecretaI)' of State makes the final decision regarding who gets P.L.-480 aid. 
Experience: P.L.-480 is credited with having built such important commercial markets for 
farm products as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and Spain. The need to get 
commodities moving through P.L.-480 is frequently frustrated by foreign policy 
considerations. 
Consequences: • Provides a government alternative to exports when the United States is not 
price competitive in the world market. 
• Combines commodity aid with development assistance and thus becomes more 
politically acceptable. 
• Reduces government stocks of commodities. 
• Promotes long-term development of markets. 
• Provides the State Department with a diplomatic tool that can be used in foreign 
policy negotiations. 
• Provides assistance in alleviating hunger and starvation. 
• Risks displacing commercial sales with P.L.-480 sales. 
• Risks becoming a disincentive for production in developing countries by providing 
too much commodity aid and making the countries overly dependent on imports. 
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Policy Tool: Two-Price Plan 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Export Subsidies 
What It Is: A two-price plan discriminates between the domestic and the foreign market by 
suppotllng a nlgner pnce ior QOmestlc srues fuan ior iorelgn srues. txpoits are, 
therefore, indirectly subsidized because domestic marketing is reduced with the 
residual ·sold for exports. 
Objective: To raise the level of producer returns while preventing the accumulation of large 
surplus commodity stocks. 
When Used: Before World War II and the negotiation of GAlT, two-price plans were used 
extensively to support farm income. Since the negotiation of GA lT~ the 
operation of two-price plans in the United States has been restricted largely to 
marketing orders and peanuts. 
Experience: Two-price plans, in essence, make the world market a residual and less profitable 
market. Advocating reduced trade barriers and operating two-price plans are 
obviously inconsistent. 
Consequences: • Producer income increases if the demand in the domestic market is more price 
responsive than in the export market. 
• Surplus stocks do not accumulate in the face of high domestic price supports. 
• Lower export market prices create the potential for price warring conditions. 
• The world market tends to become unprofitable when two-price plans are used 
extensively. 
• Controversial methods of being competitive would draw public media attention. 
• Domestic market is placed at a disadvantage relative to the foreign buyers. 
• Import restrictions are necessary to prevent the reimportation of the lower 
priced foreign sales or processed products made from the sales (see Import 
Quotas). 
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Policy Tool: Export Enhancement Program (EEP) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: EEP is an export incentive program created by the 1985 fann bill and extended by the 
1990 fann bill to pennit USDA to use surplus commodities or cash as export bonuses 
to make .U.S. products more competitive on the world market or to offset the effects of 
unfair trade practices and subsidies used by other countries. In the 1990 farm bill, 
EEP was authorized at $500 million each year through 1995. 
Objective: To make U.S. fann products price competitive on the world market, reduce commodity 
surpluses and counter unfair trading practices. 
When Used: EEP was first used in 1985 to regain North African wheat markets lost to unfair EC 
competition. Since then, EEP has been used to ship 139 million tons of agricultural 
products valued at $13.9 billion. Although wheat sales have represented over 70 
percent of total EEP shipments in most years, EEP has been used to sell poultry, flour, 
barley, sorghum, rice, cattle, animal feeds, vegetable oil, and eggs. 
Experience: The authority to implement EEP sales is granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. EEP 
was established to counter the high export subsidies used by the EC to capture wheat 
markets in Algeria and Egypt. Use of EEP has expanded to include countries in 
Eastern Europe, China, Norway, Venezuela, Israel, Poland, Philippines, Finland, and 
Dominican Republic. EEP as a share of all wheat exports has increased since 1989, 
reaching over 60 percent in 1992. Although EEP bonuses ($lbushel) have declined as 
U.S. prices have increased, U.S . action to force the EC to negotiate away such 
practices has resulted in higher bonuses in recent years. 
Consequences: • Restores competitiveness of United States in world markets despite unfair or 
subsidized competition. 
• Invites complaints from trading partners and allies such as Australia and Canada. 
• Reduces government stocks of commodities and increases price variability. 
• Violates the spirit of the GAIT. 
• Invites public image problem and undennines U.S. efforts in GAIT. 
• Offsets commercial sales of U.S. products. 
• Places upward price pressure on domestic consumers. 
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Policy Tool: Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: An agreement among an association of member nations to overcome impediments to 
trade by reducing or eliminating both tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in goods and 
services. Free trade agreements do not provide for a common external tariff for other 
nonmember countries or the free movement of labor and capital among members (see 
Preferential Trading Arrangements). 
Objective: To facilitate the free movement of goods and services among member nations of the 
agreement. A free trade agreement is the least complete form of economic integration, 
followed by a customs union, common market, and economic union. 
When Used: Unsuccessful attempts to reduce or eliminate nontariff trade barriers in GAIT have led 
to pursuit of mutual interests among nations by forming ITAs or more complete forms 
of economic or political integration, such as the EC. GAIT rules apply to the 
negotiation of IT As, and IT As must operate within the provisions of GAIT and other 
international treaties. 
Experience: The United States has negotiated free trade agreements with Israel and Canada. The 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement became effective January 1, 1989, while 
the trade agreement with Israel was signed in 1985. The most recent undertaking is 
the negotiation of an ITA among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAITA), three separate agreements will exist. 
For most goods and services, a trilateral agreement will be used. For agriculture, 
however, two bilateral agreements -- one between the United States and Mexico and 
another between Canada and Mexico -- will be required. NAIT A must first be 
approved by the U.S. Congress and similar legislative bodies in Mexico and Canada. 
It appears likely Chile will accede to NAIT A and other Latin American countries will 
consider joining. 
Consequences: • Contributes to economic efficiency gained from specialization in production of 
goods for which a comparative advantage exists. 
• Encourages free flow of goods and services among member countries. 
• Results in gains in employment and income for member participants. 
• May reduce trade with nonmember countries. 
• Allows for greater commonality of purpose in trade policies, thereby providing 
political and economic leverage in trade negotiations with nonmember nations. 
• Undermines the purpose and effectiveness of multilateral trade forums such as 
GAIT. 
• Secures gains to trade already achieved under recent economic reform in Mexico. 
• May increase use of sanitary and phytosanitary standards to restrict trade in 
agriculture. 
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Policy Tool: GATT Trigger 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: GAIT triggers are trade policy mechanisms authorized by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 which requires commodity and export program adjustments 
to be used or considered by the Secretary of Agriculture if trade reform is not achieved 
in the Uruguay Round of GAIT. Implementation of marketing loans for wheat and 
feed grains, export promotion, and waiver of acreage limitations are the major 
components. The triggers are linked to specific dates and actions taken to maintain the 
international competitiveness of U.S. program crops. GAIT triggers were necessary 
because of concerns about the reluctance of the EC to agree to meaningful agricultural 
policy reform and insistence on schemes to place import duties on U.S. oilseed and 
com gluten. 
Objective: To strengthen the U.S. arm in trade negotiations. 
When Used: If implementing legislation for a GAIT agreement was not enacted on or before June 
30, 1992, the first trigger required a $1 billion increase in export promotion programs 
and implementation of marketing loans for wheat and feed grains. It allowed the 
Secretary to consider waiving any minimum level of acreage limitation for the 1993-95 
program crop years . If no GAIT agreement becomes effective by June 30, 1993, the 
Secretary is required to consider: (a) waiving all or part of the reductions in program 
spending required by the Budget Reconciliation Act; (b) raising the level of funding 
available for export programs; and (c) instituting a marketing loan for wheat and feed 
grains. If this authority is used, action must be taken under (a) and either or both of 
(b) or (c) . If Congressional "fast track" procedures are unavailable for consideration of 
a GAIT agreement in agriculture, then (a) and (b) no longer apply . 
Experience: In announcing the 1993 wheat and feed grain programs, the Secretary chose to 
implement the provision to void the acreage reduction limitation defined by the 1990 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation. In addition, it appears a marketing loan in wheat and 
feed grains will be implemented for the 1993 crop year. On September 1, 1992, the 
President announced a $1 billion funding initiative under export enhancement for 28 
countries and covering over 13 million tons of grain. Major recipients of the initiative, 
which will remain in effect through June 30, 1993, are China, the former Soviet 
Union, Egypt, Algeria, Philippines, India, and Morocco. 
Consequences: • Cjeates additional budget costs of $1 billion for the additional export program funding 
required by the first trigger. 
• Reduces U.S. supplies and higher domestic prices for producers and consumers of wheat 
products and grain-fed meats. 
• Creates greater price instability for producers of wheat and feed grains. 
• Lowers world grain prices because of greater availability on the international market. 
• Invites possible retaliation by the EC, Australia, and Canada, all major wheat or feed grain 
exporters. 
• Encourages the EC to consider agreeing to a reduction in domestic support to agriculture 
through reform of the Common Agricultural Policy . 
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Policy Tool: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: GAIT is a multilateral United Nations treaty among 102 governments, 
including the United States. GAIT contains a code of principles and provides a 
forum for consultation and dispute settlement. Five principles govern GAIT: 
1. Trade must be nondiscriminatory. 
2. Domestic industries should be protected by tariffs as opposed to 
nontariff barriers (quotas). 
3. Tariffs agreed upon are binding, with provision for compensation if 
violated. 
4. Consultations are provided to settle disputes. 
5. GAIT procedures may be waived on agreement of the members with 
provision for compensation. Barriers in existence when GAIT was 
established (1947) are legal until negotiated away. 
Objective: To increase international trade among nations through negotiated reductions in 
tariffs and other trade barriers. These actions are designed to prevent the 
development of rounds of retaliatory trade barriers. 
When Used: GAIT came into existence October 30, 1947. Trade barrier reductions have been 
accomplished in three rounds of negotiation -- the Dillon Round (1960-61), which 
provided for European Economic Community (EEC) duty-free entrance for 
soybeans and cotton; the Kennedy Round (1963-67), which resulted in tariff 
reductions on a wide range of fann products; and the Tokyo Round (1973-79), 
which reduced nontariff barriers on a limited number of commodities. The 
Uruguay round of negotiations began in September 1986 with agriculture as the central 
focus of trade negotiations. The U.S. position in the Uruguay Round has been to call 
for the multilateral elimination of trade-distorting agricultural policies. 
Experience: While experiencing success in the first seven rounds, difficult problems with 
reducing support to agriculture have emerged in the Uruguay Round. The reduction of 
agricultural trade barriers has proven difficult because the EC has been unwilling to 
agree to proposals offered by the U.S. and other nations for the phased reduction of 
border barriers to trade and domestic policy that distorts trade. Classic examples 
include the EC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the aggressive export policies 
in both the 1985 and 1990 fann bills. 
Consequences: • GAIT has increased world trade and expanded export opportunities. 
• GAIT provides a forum for settling disputes, although it is a lengthy process. 
• GA IT restricts the latitude of participating countries in subsidizing exports 
and engaging in other trade restricting practices. 
• GAIT contains no authority for enforcement of principles against the major 
country members, often leading to retaliatory tariffs. 
• GA IT has been more effective at reducing trade barriers in industrial products 
than in agri'culture due to the problems created by domestic fann programs. 
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Policy Tool: Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: The GSP is a program pennitting duty-free entry of certain imports from 
designated developing countries. 
Objective: To assist in economic development, encourage diversification, and expand 
production of certain developing countries. 
When Used: Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 sets forth criteria for country and product 
eligibility as well as for limitations on preferential treatment. Developing 
countries not eligible for GSP include communist countries, a developing 
country that extends preferential treatment to the products of a competing 
developed country, most OPEC countries, countries that nationalize U.S. 
property without compensation, countries that do not cooperate in narcotic 
control, or countries that have aided international terrorism. Import-sensitive 
articles or commodities such as textiles are excluded from GSP. 
Experience: Developing countries purchase over one-third of all agricultural exports and have 
been the fastest growing market for farm products. GSP has helped developing 
countries to buy U.S. products, although U.S. producers of some commodities 
have been adversely affected. 
Consequences: • GSP expands developing country exports to the United States. 
• GSP increases economic growth in developing countries. 
• GSP increases export earnings for developing countries so they can import 
more. 
• GSP helps in maintaining favorable foreign relations with free world 
developing countries. 
• GSP is a low-cost means of providing aid to developing countries. 
• GSP adversely impacts U.S. farmers who produce the commodities extended 
preferential import treatment. 
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Policy Tool: Market Promotion Program (MPP) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: MPP provides assistance in cash or commodities to trade promotion organizations to 
partially fund foreign market development activities, especially in those countries 
where the U.S. encounters unfair trade practices by importers or exporters. MPP 
replaced TEA (Targeted Export Assistance) but is not limited to funding of activities 
only in markets where the United States faces unfair trade practices. Authorized by 
the 1990 farm bill, MPP was funded at $200 million in FY 91 and FY 92. Funding 
for FY 93-95 has been reduced to $148 million annually. 
Objective: MPP was created to encourage the development, maintenance, and expansion of 
commercial export markets for U.S. agricultural products through cost-share assistance, 
with priority given to those markets facing unfair trade practices. 
When Used: Priority funding assistance is provided to organizations whose commodity or product 
has experienced unfair trade practices, such as export subsidies or the use of health 
regulations to restrict trade. MPP is administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service, 
USDA. Under MPP, surplus stocks of funds are used to partially reimburse 
agricultural organizations conducting specific foreign market development activities in 
specified countries. Commodity and country coverage is much broader than under 
TEA. Funds are allocated to organizations on a matching basis. 
Experience: MPP has been used in every country of the world to promote a wide variety of 
commodities and products, including apples, pears, canned peaches, poultry, wood 
products, almonds, red meat, ginseng, dates, processed tomato products, mink pelts, 
confectionery and other processed food products. Activities partially financed by MPP 
range from market research, consumer promotion, and trade promotion to construction 
of a model feed mill and a three-story wood demonstration building. In the early 
1990s, these programs created substantial political heat because they were interpreted 
as being subsidies to agribusiness firms that were perceived as not really needing such 
subsidies. 
Consequences: • Maintains U.S. market share in the face of unfair foreign competition. 
• Expands demand for agricultural products in markets where they otherwise would 
not be sold, resulting in higher domestic prices and greater returns to producers. 
• Achieves trade policy goals of the U.S. and retaliates for unfair trade practices. 
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Policy Tool: Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: Preferential trade tenns granted to a nation to have customs duties levied on its 
products at the lowest rate offered to any other nation and making the nation eligible 
for export credit. MFN is a foundation of the GAIT. 
Objective: To assure fair and equitable treatment for all GAIT members. 
When Used: MFN status has been used by the U.S. in recent years as an incentive to force political 
and economic refonn in the fonner Soviet Union and China. 
Experience: Access to the vast U.S. market has been used to entice other countries to comply with 
certain human rights beliefs, political goals, and economic principles acceptable to the 
government of the United States. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade 
Act requires that MFN status be granted only on the basis of compliance with basic 
human rights considerations. 
Consequences: • Assists in achieving foreign policy goals of the U.S. 
• Fosters economic and political restructuring in other countries. 
• Results in increased U.S. exports as other countries are able to export more to the 
United States because of lower duties and increased foreign exchange. 
68 
Policy Tool: Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) 
Policy Area: International Trade Programs, Trade Barrier Reduction 
What It Is: Fonnal arrangements between two or more nations to eliminate restrictions 
on international trade, payments, and factor mobility for the purposes of more 
complete economic integration. The major types of preferential trading arrangements 
include free trade area, customs union, common market, and economic union. 
Objective: To stimulate economic growth by allowing the free movement of goods, services, 
labor, and capital and by providing for the coordination of member-nation monetary 
and fiscal policies. 
When Used: PTAs often represent an acceptable alternative to the slow and ineffective efforts to 
achieve increased market access and trade liberalization in GAIT. Although PT As 
open markets within the member-nation group, they are often structured to discriminate 
against nonmembers, while in full compliance with GAIT rules. 
Experience: Economic union represents the most complete fonn of economic integration whereby 
nations agree to the unification of all national social, agricultural, taxation, fiscal, and 
monetary policies, along with the acceptance of a common currency. Belgium and 
Luxembourg completed an economic union in the 1920s under which social, taxation, 
and fiscal policies were coordinated by supranational authority. A common market is 
a group of trading nations that allow free movement of goods and services, common 
external trade restrictions against nonmembers, and the free movement of factors of 
production. The EC represents one of the most important attempts to fonn a common 
market, a process which began in 1957 and is to be completed by December 31, 1992, 
under the Single European Act. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg fonned a 
customs union in 1948 to remove all tariff and nontariff barriers to trade among 
members, but impose identical trade restrictions against nonmembers. The United 
States, Mexico, and Canada are negotiating to implement the least complete fonn of 
economic integration, a free trade area (see Free Trade Agreement). 
Consequences: • Provides for free trade among members, but may limit trade with nonmembers. 
• Transfers a certain degree of economic sovereignty to a supranational authority. 
• Allows specialization in production resulting in gains in trade from economies of 
scale, greater competition, and more investment. 
• Results in the fonnation of a trading block that may be more effective in 
competing in international markets outside the block. 
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Policy Tool: Checkoff Programs 
Policy Area: Marketing, Demand Expansion 
What It Is: Checkoff programs deduct a given amount per unit of product marketed by the 
producer to finance education, market development, advertising, and/or research 
program~ (see Domestic Market Development and Foreign Market Development). 
Such programs exist under either special individual commodity legislation or general 
authorizing legislation, such as marketing orders. Such legislation may allow for 
refunds. Milk is the only commodity authorized for a processor checkoff. 
Objective: To finance foreign and domestic market development programs, advertising (mostly 
generic), education, and research on basic commodities. 
When Used: Checkoff programs are used when the necessary legislation exists and the required 
majority of the producers approve the checkoff in a referendum. In the fluid milk 
processor program, a majority of the processors voting for implementation must 
represent 60 percent of the volume. In special commodity legislation at the federal 
level, refund provisions have generally been required. Numerous states have enacted 
local checkoff programs to fund education, research and market development, e.g., 
cottonseed checkoff to fund research on cotton varieties and rice checkoff (based on 
acres planted) to fund rice research. 
Experience: Voluntary checkoff programs with refund provisions have sometimes encountered 
problems with relatively high redemption experience. As a result, the tendency has 
been to go to mandatory programs without a refund option. A high share of the funds 
generally have been spent on advertising and foreign market development. 
Consequences: • Well-managed programs increase the demand for particular products, yet overall 
demand for food probably does not change. Thus one commodity expands its 
demand at the expense of another. 
• If products such as milk and cotton are not promoted, they are not in a position to 
compete against soft drinks or synthetic fibers. 
• Checkoff programs provide a continuous flow of funds to related commodity 
organizations and thus increase the effectiveness and/or political power of these 
organizations. 
• Without refund provisions, checkoff programs provide an equitable means of 
financing costly market development programs. 
• With refund provisions, checkoff programs offer the potential for inequities and a 
reduction in effectiveness. 
73 
Policy Tool: Domestic Market Development 
Policy Area: Marketing, Demand Expansion 
What It Is: Domestic market development programs assist producers in raising funds required to 
cany out generic promotion and advertising programs (see Checkoff Programs). Such 
programs are authorized on an individual commodity basis under either Congressional 
or state legislative authority. At the national level, they generally are administered by 
a Board of Directors appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, with USDA having 
oversight responsibilities. The 1990 farm bill authorized a fluid milk promotion 
program for processors. 
Objective: To expand the domestic demand for farm products. 
When Used: Domestic market development programs get started only on the initiative of producers 
and/or processors who sponsor portions of the program. Producers have to be 
organized to obtain the checkoff legislation or marketing order programs needed to 
implement a market development program. Market development programs have been 
most extensive in milk, cotton, and oranges, although programs exist in many other 
commodities. Several of the marketing orders contain provisions for the collection of 
funds needed for market development activities. 
Experience: Most producer domestic market development programs are generic and promote the 
product in general as opposed to a particular brand of the product. In a limited 
number of instances (e .g., cotton), significant resources are devoted to joint advertising 
that has the effect of subsidizing the advertising of innovative new uses of a branded 
product. The only authorized processor program is fluid milk. Research indicates 
brand promotion and joint advertising programs are more effective than generic 
advertising. Promotion and advertising programs must be geared to the availability of 
the product and the size of the market. In the early 1990s, the dairy checkoff program 
created intra-industry controversy when conflict developed between state programs and 
the federal dairy board. Low prices for milk fostered discontent over the merits of the 
program. 
Consequences: • A well-conceived and well-researched producer-oriented advertising program has 
the potential for raising producer returns through demand expansion. 
• Promotion and advertising programs are high in cost and difficult to evaluate. 
• Promotion and advertising programs must be geared to product availability and 
market size. 
• Advertising programs often inspire feedback, giving producers a better reading on 
consumer attitudes. 
• Advertising gives a commodity visibility and political strength. 
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Policy Tool: Foreign Market Development, Cooperator Programs 
Policy Area: Marketing, Demand Expansion 
What It Is: Foreign market development activities of the U. S. government involve assisting firms 
or producer organizations in selling products abroad. These programs, managed by the 
Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) in the USDA, are planned, implemented, evaluated, 
and financed jointly by the FAS and the cooperator organizations. They emphasize 
market information and technical assistance in servicing the needs of importing 
countries to utilize products effectively, enhance buyer awareness, and educate 
consumers. Producer program costs are generally financed through a checkoff 
program on commodities sold (see Checkoff Programs). 
Objective: To expand export demand for agricultural products. 
When Used: Foreign market development activities depend heavily on producer, processor and 
handler initiative to develop and finance a joint F AS-industry cooperator program. 
While FAS through its agricultural counselors has a general responsibility to promote 
exports, the greatest effort is devoted to those products that have cooperator programs. 
Experience: Cooperator programs that are well-conceived and well-financed are effective at 
expanding the demand as long as the commodity is available at competitive prices. It 
is difficult, if not impossible, to expand export markets for U. S. farm products when 
U.S. prices are higher than world prices. 
Consequences: • Increases quantity of products exported. 
• Increases producer understanding of international markets. 
• Increases cost effectiveness as a result of large numbers of producers sharing the 
cost of operating the market development programs (see Checkoff Programs). 
• Increases the" potential for exporting more value added products rather than raw 
commodities. 
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Policy Tool: Cooperatives, Capper-Volstead 
Policy Area: Marketing, Market Organization and Control 
What It Is: The Capper-Volstead Act gives producers the right to act together in marketing their 
products, therefore providing cooperatives limited exemption from the antitrust laws. 
It prohibits cooperatives from unduly enhancing price, however. The Secretary of 
Agriculture is responsible for enforcing the provisions regarding undue price 
enhancement. 
Objective: To assist producers in jointly marketing their products by providing a means for 
improving terms of trade, lowering costs, stabilizing market flows, expanding markets, 
or improving communication. 
When Used: The Capper-Volstead exemption is limited to farmers and to marketing functions. 
Farmers are those involved in actual growing functions; therefore, agribusiness 
corporate integrators are not farmers. Likewise, joint activities between cooperatives 
and noncooperative are not covered by the Capper-Volstead exemption. Marketing 
functions are interpreted broadly to include bargaining, information, pricing, 
processing, and so forth. Cooperatives appear to have virtually unlimited rights to 
merge with one another. They cannot, however, engage in predatory or coercive 
practices with regard to either members or nonmembers. 
Experience: Cooperatives have effectively organized to market their products in a number of ways. 
The cooperative market share is about 28 percent overall but as high as 80 percent of 
the market in milk. Cooperatives are most effective when there is a firm producer 
commitment to market through them. Marketing orders are frequently used to 
augment cooperative market power and influence. Proposals have been made to 
eliminate the Capper-Volstead exemption or to transfer it to the Federal Trade 
Commission for ·enforcement. 
Consequences: • Suspending provisions of the Capper-Volstead Act would render pricing activities 
among farmers a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
• Cooperatives have the potential for raising producer returns if the cooperative is 
well-organized, well-managed, and has a commitment from producers to market 
through the cooperative. 
• A cooperative's influence is frequently eroded by "free riders" who obtain the 
benefits of the cooperative but pay none of the costs. 
• Substantial producer investment is generally required for successful cooperative 
activity. 
• Cooperatives have been important to the functioning of marketing orders because 
cooperative members have been allowed to vote as a bloc. Orders augment 
cooperative market power. 
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Policy Tool: Marketing Boards 
Policy Area: Marketing, Market Organization and Control 
What It Is: A marketing board is a central government authority that directs the marketing of a 
commodity. Export management is the most frequently performed function of a 
marketing board. With all exports centralized in a single government agency, 
producers give up the right to their commodities at harvest; all storage and marketing 
functions are managed by the government. Producers receive an advance on 
commodities delivered or stored on the farm, with subsequent payments being made as 
marketing is completed. All producers receive the same price (price pool) adjusted for 
location and quality. Additional farm program provisions, such as minimum return to 
producers, may also be provided through the marketing board. 
Objective: To raise and stabilize producer prices as well as offset the superior market power of 
commodity buyers. 
When Used: Marketing boards have never been used in the United States. They are used 
extensively in Canada, Australia, and South Africa. 
Experience: Evidence of the impact of marketing boards on producer prices and incomes is mixed. 
Some show higher returns than others. Boards do, however, provide increased price 
and income stability to the producer, who is shielded from the effects of within-year 
price fluctuation. While boards are frequently credited with providing strict control 
over production, their records are considerably less impressive. Conflicts arose in 
negotiations over the Canadian Free Trade Agreement with Canadian marketing boards 
that maintained producer prices above those in the United States. 
Consequences: • Within-year producer price and income risk are reduced. 
• The marketing and pricing function is removed from the producer. 
• Much of the profit opportunities from handling and storing grain is eliminated. 
• The influence of major exporting and marketing firms on commodity prices is 
reduced. 
• The role of government in marketing is substantially increased. 
• The United States would be better able to compete against state traders for export 
sales if it operated with a marketing board. 
• If adopted by the United States, the continued existence of viable futures and 
options markets would be questionable. 
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Policy Tool: Marketing Orders 
Policy Area: Marketing, Market Organization and Control 
What It Is: Marketing orders are joint industry-government programs that may be authorized to 
manage the following industry-wide marketing activities: advertising, size or 
container, quality, and quantity or price (in some cases). Marketing orders are 
authorized for specific commodities under the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act 
of 1937. 
Objective: To create more orderly marketing conditions for farm products and thereby stabilize 
supplies, prices, and producer incomes. 
When Used: Marketing orders are available only for commodities designated in the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreements Act. These include specific fruits, vegetables, nuts, and milk. 
Orders for fruits, vegetables, and nuts emphasize the establishment of minimum 
quality, grade, size, or maturity standards for products entering the market. Reserve 
pools exist for some commodities in which stocks are held over the marketing season 
or into the next marketing season. Milk prices are set by the marketing order in terms 
of the milk's end use. Higher prices are charged for milk used for fluid purposes. 
Orders are put into effect after a request is received from producers (generally a 
cooperative), a hearing is held, the Secretary of Agriculture concurs, and two-thirds of 
the affected producers approve in a referendum. The 1985 farm bill deviated from 
these procedures by virtually mandating changes in milk marketing order provisions. 
Experience: Marketing orders have been highly effective in stabilizing markets where they have 
been used. Over time, however, the Secretary of Agriculture has been less inclined to 
utilize orders as strict supply management tools. Emphasis has been placed on orderly 
marketing "and price stabilization. Strict marketing quotas have been limited to minor 
commodities such as hops and peppermint. All marketing orders with market flow 
provisions are under attack by the Office of Management and Budget as well as 
consumer advocate groups. 
Consequences: • The balance of market power shifts from processors to producer cooperatives. 
• Strict marketing controls increase price stability throughout the marketing season. 
• Commodities available for sale have a more uniform quality. 
• Commodities are more readily available throughout the year. 
• Producer prices increase. 
• A tendency for over-production is often seen under order provisions creating 
incentives to control production and/or marketings. 
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Policy Tool: Crop and Livestock Production Report 
Policy Area: Marketing, Market Facilitators 
What It Is: Crop and livestock production reports provide detailed estimates (predictions) of crop 
production from before planting (intentions) through harvest. 
Objective: To improve the quality and quantity of available information on production prospects 
and thereby make markets more competitive. 
When Used: Crop and livestock production reports have their origin in a series of laws enacted 
between World War I and the late 1940s. They are used by the private sector as an 
aid to production and marketing decisions, by economists to forecast, and by 
government officials to develop policy and aid in program decisions. 
Experience: The USDA's goal is to provide estimates within 1 or 2 percent of actual production or 
prices . Its record in achieving this degree of accuracy has been outstanding. USDA 
crop reports are frequently charged with having the effect of lowering farm prices. A 
bias one way or the other is impossible to confirm. Extensive steps are taken to 
protect the integrity of the reports. Government- cost-cutting measures, however, have 
reduced the quantity (and maybe the quality) of available information. USDA efforts 
to charge for access to crop and livestock production reports have come under 
considerable fire . 
Consequences: • Crop and livestock reports add information to the market and thus make markets 
more competitive. 
• Without crop and livestock reports, this information would be available only to 
those firms that could afford this service from private information sources. This 
would be mainly agribusiness firms and large-scale farmers. 
• Crop and livestock reports increase the accuracy of both public and private sector 
economic outlook and situation analysis. 
• Crop and livestock reports are needed for informed policy decisions. They provide 
the data base for conducting economic analyses. 
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Policy Tool: Export Sales Reporting 
Policy Area: Marketing Programs, Market Facilitators 
What It Is: The USDA presently requires that export sales involving more than 100,000 MT of 
major grains and oilseeds be reported to the USDA within 24 hours of sale. For other 
commodities, weekly reports are required. 
Objective: To provide information for the government to use in developing export policies and 
programs, to provide producers with information to help in their marketing decisions, 
and to improve performance of U.S. commodity markets by making timely information 
on export sales transactions available to the public. 
When Used: Following the impacts of the unanticipated large grain sales to the USSR in 1972, the 
government instituted the export sales reporting system in September 1973 under 
Section 812 of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. It has been in 
operation since that time. Modifications to the system were made in 1980 to shorten 
the public reporting lags of 11 to 18 days to approximately 7 to 14 days. 
Experience: The export sales reporting system has had moderate success in achieving its goal of 
increased access to timely information. The system still suffers from substantial lag 
time in reporting information and limited detail on contract specifics. A number of 
alternatives have been considered, including specific contract terms and prenotification. 
Consequences: • The reporting system increases the overall quality and quantity of information 
concerning export transactions. 
• Sales reporting provides the USDA prior warning of sales that could jeopardize 
available U.S. supplies. 
• More inform.ation on large export sales reduces the probability of an embargo. 
resulting from commodity shortages. 
• Prices are more responsive to export sales when stock levels are low relative to 
use. 
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Policy ·Tool: Grades and Standards 
Policy Area: Marketing, Market Facilitators 
What It Is: Grades and standards classify units of a commodity according to quality so the 
variation or range in quality is smaller within groups than it is over the whole range of 
the commodity. 
Objective: To develop homogeneous quality groups to facilitate orderly marketing of a 
commodity. 
When Used: Grain grades are established under the U. S. Grain Standards Act while other grades 
are established under several different pieces of legislation, including the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1946. Grades and standards exist for virtually all agricultural 
commodities. Most grades are primarily designed to facilitate trading at the wholesale 
market level although grades such as those on beef have a definite consumer 
orientation. 
Experience: Once grades are established, they are very difficult to change. In addition, there is 
resistance to the establishment of consumer-oriented grades because opportunities for 
product differentiation (advertising) are reduced. Questions exist regarding the extent 
to which grades should reflect the end use of the product. Private grades and USDA 
grades frequently reflect a different set of factors. Over time, grades and standards 
tend to become unresponsive to consumer preferences, probably because of resistance 
to changing the grades. As a result, changing grades to become more consumer 
oriented has become a major goal of consumer advocates. 
Consequences: • Grades increase the quantity of information available to buyers and sellers. 
• Grades increase the accuracy of pricing within different quality classes of the 
commodity . . 
• Grades reduce the opportunity for abuse and misunderstanding between buyers and 
sellers of commodities that are sold without buyer inspection. 
• Grades provide incentive for the quality marketed to be the lowest acceptable level 
for each grade. 
• Grades reduce the opportunity for product differentiation and the incentive for 
product development. 
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Policy Tool: Market News Price Reporting 
Policy Area: Marketing Programs, Market Facilitators 
What It Is: Market news provides daily information on prices in spot or cash markets for farm 
products. 
Objective: To improve the quality and quantity of information on market activity available to 
farmers and agribusiness firms and thereby make market conditions more competitive. 
When Used: Authority for market news extends back to World War I. 
Experience: Market news has been in a continuous state of modernization and improvement since it 
was established. Market news increasingly finds itself competing with private 
information sources such as Urner-Barry and Yellow Sheet. These private reports are 
used extensively in formula pricing. Private reports have been the subject of much 
debate over accuracy and reliability, while USDA reports have been subject to 
questions of timeliness, accuracy, and statistical reliability. Proposals have been made 
to transfer all market news functions to the private sector. Considerable controversy 
surrounds USDA's unwillingness to report contract terms for products such as broilers. 
Consequences: • Market news provides increased equality of price information among producers 
and agribusiness firms. 
• Market news is of greatest benefit to small and middle-size farm firms because 
they can less afford private sources of information. 
• Market news acts as a public check on private sources of market information. 
• Market news is even more useful with increasing numbers of vertical integration 
and forward contracts that reduce price information in the market. 
• Government cost-cutting measures raise the question of what market news users 
should pay for price infornlation. 
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Policy Tool: School Lunch 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What It Is: The school lunch program provides assistance to schools through direct commodity 
distribution, cash subsidies, and, at times, subsidies for the purchase of equipment. 
Over time this program has been expanded to encompass both breakfast and lunch. 
Free or subsidized meals are given to children from low-income households. 
Objective: To improve the nutritional levels of school-age children and ensure that they have at 
least one nutritionally balanced meal on school days. 
When Used: The school lunch program has been in existence since the 1930s. Over time it has 
gradually put increasing emphasis on cash as opposed to commodity distribution. 
Schools have had increasing impact on the specific commodities obtained under the 
program. In the early 1990s, the program annually fed nearly 25 million students at a 
federal cost of about $5 billion. 
Experience: The school lunch program began as a depression measure to support prices and to 
improve nutritional levels for all school children. From its inception through much of 
the 1960s, emphasis was placed on distributing surplus commodities in a nutritionally 
balanced relationship. Schools, however, gradually wanted more to say about what 
was received. In addition, increasing costs of in-school food preparation, relative to 
institutional and fast-food preparation, led to increased pressure to provide a larger 
proportion of cash subsidies relative to commodities. The increasing cost of meals led 
to school lunch and breakfast subsidies being restricted to children from low-income 
households. One of the main problems with the program has been complaints about 
the quality of meals served. In 1992, the Secretary of Agriculture made a commitment 
to reduce the fat content of the meals to a level of 30 percent or less. This included a 
commitment to iinplement the Dietary Guidelines into the school lunch and breakfast 
program . Pressure always exists to provide a larger proportion of cash assistance . 
Consequences: • Increases the demand for food used in the school lunch program. 
• Increases the nutritional levels of school-age children, particularly children from 
low-income households. 
• Provides an important outlet for surplus dairy products, meats, fruits, and 
vegetables in spite of the fact that the distributed commodities are a less important 
proportion of the total food consumed. 
• Fosters development of a large institutional food service sector to serve this large 
program. 
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Policy Tool: Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Program 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What It Is: The WIC program combines direct commodity distribution with nutrition education. 
Most WIC recipients probably are also on food stamps or aid to families with 
dependent children. Nutrition education programs teach the recipients how to combine 
commodities with food expenditure dollars most effectively to improve nutrition and 
family living standards. 
Objectives: To provide low-income mothers with a complete assistance program designed to 
improve nutrition levels for the family as a whole. 
When Used: WIC has experienced almost continual expansion since the program began on an 
experimental basis in the early 1960s. Program participation has a tendency to 
increase in times of recession and increased unemployment. 
Experience: Many of the recipients are single mothers with low incomes and pre-school children. 
Although WIC has been criticized for its constituency of predominantly unwed 
mothers, studies indicate that it is one of the nation's most effective programs in 
improving nutritional levels. This results largely from the combination of monetary, 
commodity, and nutrition education assistance. Attempts to discontinue the WIC 
program (as a cost-reducing measure) have consistently failed under the weight of 
studies showing the positive impact on nutrition and the resulting broad-based "hunger 
lobby" support. 
Consequences: • Nutrition education programs result in increased consumption of foods normally 
considered to be part of a nutritionally balanced diet -- particularly poultry, milk, 
cereals, fruits, and vegetables. 
• Overall recipient nutritional level is demonstrably improved. 
• Distributed commodities tend to be in surplus and/or have particular nutritional 
value. 
• Distributed commodities partially displace commercial retail sales of these products 
and their substitutes. 
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Policy Tool: Cashing Out, Welfare Reform 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What Is It: Cashing out would provide food assistance in cash rather than commodities or food 
stamps. All food and income assistance programs would be consolidated into a single 
cash payment. 
Objective: To provide income assistance to low-income households. 
When Used: While cash has not yet been substituted for food stamps, there has been a gradual but 
persistent movement in the direction of providing a larger proportion of cash assistance 
as opposed to commodity or food stamp assistance. Cash subsidies to schools and 
food stamps that have been substituted for direct commodity distribution have become 
increasingly important relative to commodities. 
Experience: Cash has provided schools greater flexibility in the ultimate use of assistance. Also, 
some argue that cash donations result in a greater increase in satisfaction. The cost of 
running several programs, each having different eligibility standards, has become 
increasingly high. There are those who believe that such consumer-oriented policy 
changes have come to so dominate USDA that producer-oriented programs have taken 
a back seat. 
Consequences: • The total welfare bill would be reduced if program duplications were eliminated. 
• Food consumption would fall if the current levels of food stamp and commodity 
distribution were provided in cash. 
• Prices of surplus commodities would fluctuate more if government outlets for 
surplus commodities were reduced. 
• Food assistance programs, if moved out of USDA, would not be part of the farm 
bill deliberations, thus reducing the potential for obtaining urban support for farm 
programs. 
87 
Policy Tool: Commodity Distribution 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition, and Safety 
What It Is: Commodity distribution programs provide primarily staple food products direct from 
the government to needy households. These commodities are generally in surplus, 
although nonsurplus food has been provided in times of high unemployment. 
Commodities are distributed to school lunches, elderly feeding programs, and 
households that qualify according to specific eligibility standards (i .e., unemployment 
or participation in some welfare program). 
Objective: To expand the demand for farm products, utilize surplus commodities, and improve 
nutrition. 
When Used: Commodity distribution was a forerunner of the food stamp program. Such direct 
distribution programs date back to the Great Depression era. However, even after 
widespread adoption of the food stamp program in the 1960s, commodity distribution 
has resurfaced periodically to dispose of surplus government stocks or to deal with 
problems of unemployment and poverty. The special cheese and butter distribution 
programs that operated in the early to mid-1980s (Temporary Emergency Food 
Assistance Program, TEF AP) were an example of such surplus disposal efforts . 
Experience: Commodity distribution programs are costly because of the necessary network of needs 
assessment, processing, storage, transportation and distribution systems. With the 
advent of food stamps in the 1960s, the direct distribution system was dismantled . In 
the 1980s when surpluses and unemployment reappeared, pressure grew to once again 
distribute commodities -- beginning with cheese. Rather than establishing a 
distribution system, the Reagan administration provided the commodities to volunteer 
welfare groups such as churches. It was found, however, that under this system, many 
unqualified recipients received the products. Subsequently, government appropriations 
were provided to pay for at least a portion of the costs of distribution . When surpluses 
disappeared in the late 1980s, it was found to be politically difficult to discontinue the 
program. 
Consequences: • Product movement is expanded to the extent that the quantities given away exceed 
normal recipient consumption levels. Reduced expenditures on distributed 
products result in purchases of other foods and/or nonfood items. 
• Nutrition levels of recipients are improved to the extent of the nutritional value of 
the additional quantities or items consumed. 
• The commodities given away displace retail sales of the commodities and their 
substitutes. If people are given commodities, they certainly will not buy them or 
the substitutes for them . Food processors and retailers thus tend to oppose direct 
distribution programs. 
• For surplus commodities (e .g., dairy products) that are acquired under price 
support programs, the government actually purchases more products to the extent 
that those people receiving the products buy less of them through grocery stores . 
• Once started, these programs are politically difficult to discontinue . 
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Policy Tool: Food Stamps 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What It Is: The food stamp program provides eligible recipients with stamps that have an 
equivalent cash value. Eligibility is deteffilined on the basis of income levels in 
relation to established poverty guidelines. Level of assistance is based on a USDA 
"thrift food budget" covering the cost of commodities needed to achieve a balanced 
diet. Higher levels of assistance are provided for lower incomes and larger family 
sIzes. 
Objective: To provide income assistance for the purchase of food by low-income households and 
thereby expand the demand for food as well as improve nutritional levels of recipients. 
When Used: The food stamp program, while first used in the 1930s, began in earnest as a long-teffil 
food assistance program in the early 1960s and mushroomed to a social program 
serving more than 23 million recipients and costing in the early 1990s about $15 
billion annually. Food manufacturers and retailers actively supported the conversion 
from direct commodity distribution to food stamps because food stamps do not 
displace commercial sales (see Commodity Distribution). 
. Experience: The merits of the food stamp program have been extensively debated. Major concerns 
regarding the program involve who should be eligible, the level of assistance, the 
commodities allowed to be purchased with stamps, and the potential for program 
abuse. Among the advocates of change are some who would prefer going back to 
commodity distribution and others who would prefer giving recipients cash (referred to 
as "cashing out"). Some advocate moving food stamps out of USDA. 
Consequences: • Increased food consumption expenditures account for 26-50 percent of the value of 
food stamps" The remainder goes to purchase other goods and services from 
dollars that would have been spent on food if stamps had not been received. The 
program, therefore, releases income for spending on other goods and services. The 
largest increases occur in the demand for meat, milk, and poultry. 
• Some farm-state congressmen argue that the food stamp program helps them get 
farm legislation through the Congress because major farm bills with food program 
components invariably attract urban interest. 
• Nutritional levels of recipients improve, although not as much as under such 
programs as WIC. 
• Food retailers, particularly those in low-income neighborhoods, realize direct 
benefits. 
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Policy Tool: Delaney Clause, Zero Tolerance 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What It Is: Delaney is a clause of the Food Additive Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act. The clause states that there shall be no cancer-causing substances added to the 
food supply. The standard is zero tolerance, meaning that food additives must be 
completely devoid of carcinogens. 
Objective: To protect the general public from carcinogens entering the food supply. The Delaney 
clause specifically relates to the elimination of cancer-causing substances. 
When Used: The Delaney clause was enacted in 1958. Zero tolerance has ostensively been applied 
as a standard for food additives ever since. However, zero can only be measured in 
terms of the sensitivity of the instrument used to detect specific chemicals or other 
harmful substances. As the scientific instruments have become increasingly sensitive, 
more potentially harmful substances (residues) have been discovered in the food 
supply. As a result, FDA has applied a de minimus tolerance. This means extremely 
small risks (levels) can be ignored. FDA established the de minimus tolerance at one 
in 1 million, meaning that an additive or residue cannot cause more than one 
additional cancer death per million people. 
Experience: Delaney has worked as a standard only because FDA has followed the de minimus 
tolerance. Otherwise, FDA would have been continuously banning additional 
substances as the detection instruments became more sensitive. While realizing the 
inconsistence in interpretation with the law, Congress has been unable to muster 
enough votes to change the Delaney standard, which. has substantial public appeal and 
support. Recent Federal Court decisions have held that zero tolerance means exactly 
that. FDA must either enforce it or Congress must change it. 
Consequences: • Many food additives become unusable. 
• A lower level of tolerance means higher costs. 
• Zero tolerance can reduce the number of products available on the market because 
there are no substitutes. Thus, there is less consumer/producer choice. 
• A true zero tolerance cannot be objectively enforced because zero cannot be 
objectively measured. 
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Policy Tool: Pesticides Regulation, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What It Is: FIFRA is legislation requiring registration of new pesticides before they can be sold. 
It requires the reregistration of existing chemicals by 1997. 
Objective: To protect the public from hazardous chemical residue that might otherwise create 
health problems, primarily cancer. 
When Used: Pesticide regulations were first adopted in 1910 regulating only the sale of adulterated 
or misbranded pesticides. FIFRA was enacted in 1947 to require the registration of 
pesticides. The requirements for registration include efficacy and safety. While the 
responsibility for proof rested initially on the government, it was shifted to the 
manufacturer in 1954. The standard for registration involves a balancing of risks and 
benefits . By 1997 all pesticides must be reregistered. 
Experience: The registration process is lengthy, time consuming, and costly. Many chemicals, 
some for which there are no effective substitutes, have been banned. For some minor 
use chemicals, the manufacturers have decided that they cannot bear the cost of 
reregistration. The agriculture committees have maintained jurisdiction over FIFRA 
despite its move out of USDA in 1940 and to EPA in 1970. 
Consequences: • Regulations improve the safety of the food -supply. 
• Lengthy testing procedures and red tape for approval of new pesticides and 
reregistration of existing pesticides have two effects: increased cost to end users 
and reduced number of pesticides on the market. 
• U.S. producers claim they are at a disadvantage relative to growers in other 
countries who use chemicals not available domestically. 
• Fewer pesticides are available for agricultural producers as 1997 approaches. 
• Regulations delay introduction of new pesticides. 
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Policy Tool: Nutrition Labeling 
Policy Area: Food Assistance, Nutrition and Safety 
What It Is: The National Labeling and Education Act of 1990 is designed to replace and update 
the nutritional labeling policy implemented in 1975. The former policy was mostly 
voluntary while the new act is mandatory, preempting all state . regulations. 
• Standard serving size in an amount normally consumed. 
• Content of individual nutrients based on the standard serving size including 
calories, fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, carbohydrates, complex carbohydrates, 
sugar, fiber, protein, sodium, calcium, etc. 
• Dictionary of product descriptions such as low calorie, reduced calorie, low fat, 
etc. 
• Health chain relationships such as fat and cancer, fat and heart disease, calcium 
and osteoporosis, sodium and hypertension. 
The new labeling requirement covers virtually all manufactured food products. Fresh 
meats and produce items are excluded. Small food manufacturers will also be exempt. 
Objective: To provide consumers the information base for making improved nutrition decisions. 
When Used: The labeling law must be implemented by May 1994. 
Experience: The old law was voluntary except for fortified foods and instances in which a nutrition 
claim was made. It was used on an estimated 60 percent of manufactured products. 
Frequently, products with attractive nutritional properties were labeled. The new 
policy will cover some products with unattractive nutritional properties, especially 
products with high fat and sodium and low fiber. 
Consequences: • Improved basis for nutrition decisions. 
• Potential for reduced consumption of fats, saturated fats , cholesterol, and refined 
sugar. 
• Potential of substitution of labeling for other regulations such as standards of 
identity. 
• New emphasis on fat, especially animal fat, may change American diet away from 
some traditional products. 
92 
) 
CREDIT PROGRAMS 
[Blank Page in original Biilletin]. 
,I' 
\ 
, .. ' 
. : :~ " ~ 
.. (" ,'" $", ",. " ~ .' l~ .. 
. ,.:. 
Policy Tool: Farm Credit System Capital Corporation 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
What It Is: The Farm Credit Corporation was a separate entity of the Farm Credit System 
rechartered to: (1) direct the pooling and allocation of System risk capital, (2) 
purchase, restructure and/or dispose of distressed System assets, and (3) manage the 
use and repayment of any eventual federal assistance. 
Objective: The Capital Corporation was intended to serve as the mechanism for allocating risk 
funds and federal assistance as needed to maintain the System's integrity. 
When Used: The Capital Corporation was chartered originally to facilitate movement of the 
System's capital assistance to, and management of, distressed assets in the Spokane and 
Omaha Farm Credit Districts. With the passage of the 1985 Farm Credit Amendment 
Act, its role was expanded to ensure that the System's own capital would be fully 
utilized before any federal assistance would be provided. 
Experience: In its implementation, the Capital Corporation experienced considerable delays and 
resistance in establishing guidelines for withdrawing capital from contributing districts 
and in developing uniform credit standards and control procedures. The Agricultural 
Credit Act of 1987 replaced the Capital Corporation with the Farm Credit System 
Assistance Corporation. The precedent for assistance to the System was established at 
its inception when government funds were used to capitalize the System. 
Consequences: • The Capital Corporation and the 1985 Farm Credit Amendlnent Act helped reduce 
System borrowers and investors feared that their investments would be lost. 
• The initial effect on investors was to lower the risk premium the System was 
paying for its funds. 
• The Capital Corporation creates a source of liquidity for institutions with large 
portfolios of nonperforming loans. 
• If the distressed assets were conservatively valued and purchased at a discount, the 
Capital Corporation would have increased flexibility in restructuring distressed 
credit. 
• Increased liquidity, lower cost of funds, and capital assistance can contribute to the 
stabilization of farm asset values by reducing pressure on System institutions to 
acquire and liquidate collateral. 
• The increased centralization of regulatory authority tends to reduce local autonomy 
and control over the System. 
• One of the key issues is the cost of any government assistance. If the funds are 
free or subsidized, the System can benefit tremendously in terms of rebuilding 
capital, but the cost is passed on to the public. 
• Centralization of administering distressed assets can increase the visibility and 
political sensitivity to such a level that the System is unable to manage these assets 
in a businesslike manner. This would defeat many of the benefits afforded by the 
Capital Corporation concept. 
95 
Policy Tool: Interest Buy-Down 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
What It Is: An interest rate buy-down involves an interest rate reduction on existing loans with the 
government paying a portion of the cost. 
Objective: To improve a producer's financial position by reducing interest cost. 
When Used: An interest rate buy-down provided for in the 1985 farm bill allowed FmHA to pay 50 
percent of the total cost of reducing the interest rate to the qualified borrower, up to a 
maximum of 4 percentage points. "Ibe 1990 farm bill maintained the 4 percent buy-
down, but permitted FmHA to pay the total cost. The buy-down is to be used only if 
there is no alternative way to project a positive cash flow. The duration of the buy-
down may not exceed three years. A number of states also have implemented interest 
buy-down programs to assist financially distressed farmers and ranchers. 
Experience: Interest rate buy-downs can be used to restructure debt held by private lenders when 
there is a reasonable chance the borrower can recover. The program also has been 
used to reduce the workload for an overburdened FmHA by leaving debt servicing in 
the hands of private lenders. Lender participation has been less than might have been 
anticipated because of the requirement to accept a lower rate of return. State programs 
have encountered considerably higher costs than had been anticipated. 
Consequences: • Private lender participation depends on whether they stand to lose less by no 
longer financing the borrower or by accepting a lower return in anticipation that 
the borrower's situation will improve. 
• Rural communities benefit directly if the buy-down reduces borrowers' cash flow 
burdens and/or the number of farm liquidations. 
• Because interest buy-downs are temporary, they benefit financially stressed 
borrowers only in the short run. 
• Interest buy-downs can create a great deal of ill will on the part of producers who 
are paying their debts and bearing the full cost of debt servicing. 
• Interest rate buy-downs can result in large public outlays. 
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Policy Tool: Loan Mediation 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
What It Is: Loan mediation is a process that brings borrowers and creditors together with a neutral 
third-party mediator to resolve loan problems before they reach the point that the only 
options are foreclosure or legal action. 
Objective: To resolve borrower/creditor disputes more quickly and with less cost than litigation. 
Because the mediation process is not adversarial, it is better suited to resolving 
disputes without destroying the relationship between the disputants. 
When Used: The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 provided funding to develop statewide mediation 
programs, subject to state approval, with the USDA and FmHA monitoring the 
programs. Several states already had established programs prior to the passage of the 
Agricultural Credit Act. Participation in non-binding mediation may be voluntary or 
mandatory depending upon individual state legislation. Eligibility for federal funding 
has been on a matching basis and requires that the programs be certified by FmHA. 
Experience: Because the mediation process, unlike arbitration, is non-binding on participants, the 
programs have been generally well accepted by both lenders and borrowers. An 
analysis by FmHA indicated that mediation programs have saved the government from 
two to three times the amount spent to fund the programs. 
Consequences: • Rural communities can benefit if mediation results in a successful resolution that 
allows the farmer to continue in a successful business. Benefits accrue from 
reducing outmigration and avoiding increased demands for public welfare services. 
• Voluntary resolutions to borrower/creditor disputes can be less costly and less time 
consuming than litigation. 
• The resolution of disputes through mediation can help maintain a working 
relationship between the parties involved. 
• Because the mediation process is non-binding and creditors maintain the right to 
pursue litigation if the dispute is not resolved to their satisfaction, mediation offers 
the opportunity to achieve a "least-loss" solution. 
• Although participants may pay a nominal fee for mediation services, most program 
costs are born by the public. 
• When a relatively large number of creditors are involved, it may not be possible to 
reach an effective solution without the agreement of all parties. Thus, the refusal 
of one party to participate in the mediation process can result in situations in 
which no agreement can be reached that provides the participating parties with a 
"win-win" solution. 
• If lenders believe the mediation process is not impartial and that the mediator is 
acting as a borrower advocate, it can destroy the effectiveness of the program. 
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Policy Tool: Mandatory Debt Restructuring 
Policy Area: Credit Programs 
What It is: Prior to foreclosing on a distressed loan, some lenders are required to evaluate possible 
restructuring alternatives and to restructure those loans whenever restructuring would 
be a less costly alternative than foreclosure. 
Objective: To minimize the amount of loan losses and the number of displaced fanners that 
would result from foreclosure. 
When Used: The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 requires FmHA and all Federal Land Bank 
Associations, Production Credit Associations, and other financing institutions that 
discount with the Fann Credit Banks to restructure distressed loans if restructuring 
would be less costly than foreclosure. 
Experience: The debt restructuring requirement has resulted in significant loan write-offs by FmHA 
and the Cooperative Fann Credit System. However, these write-off losses also would 
have occurred in the event of a foreclosure, and the legal costs and borrower 
displacement that would have resulted from foreclosure have been reduced. 
Consequences: • Restructuring can reduce borrower displacement. 
• Restructuring can result in fewer distressed assets being forced on the market, 
thereby reducing the downward pressure on all fann asset values. 
• Restructuring can reduce the legal costs and number of bankruptcies that would 
otherwise occur. 
• The loan write-offs represent losses that lenders would incur anyway if they 
foreclosed. 
• Rural comm~nities can benefit from a reduction in the number of fann liquidations 
and in the number of displaced fanners. 
• Debt restructuring can create ill will on the part of producers in like circumstances 
who are financed by lenders not subject to the restructuring requirements. 
• If borrowers with restructured debt continue to lose money, leaving them in control 
of the assets can increase the amount of lenders' future losses. 
• There is nothing about restructuring that results in borrowers doing a better job of 
managing the business. 
• MandatoI)' restructuring requirements may result in reduced credit being available 
to higher risk borrowers who are most likely to develop problems that would 
jeopardize the lender's security position. 
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Policy Tool: Principal and Interest Deferrals 
... 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuri~g 
What It Is: Principal deferrals -- borrowers are not required to make principal payments on part or 
all of the debt for a designated time period but are required to pay interest. Interest 
deferrals -- borrowers are not required to make interest payments on part or all of the 
debt for a designated time period but interest would accrue and be added to the debt. 
Objective: To allow a borrower with cash flow problems time to restructure debt or recover from 
adverse economic pressure. 
When Used: Used when adverse economic conditions are expected to be temporary or time is 
needed to restructure the operation to alleviate cash flow problems. Most private 
lenders do not defer interest but roll it into the principal of the loan. This policy 
results from legal limitations on the collection of interest that is past due for longer 
than a specific period. FmHA uses a combination of a principal deferral and interest 
waiver in its debt adjustment program. If it is necessary for the operation to meet cash 
flow requirements, a qualified FmHA borrower may defer a portion of the principal for 
up to five years and accrue no interest on the deferred portion. 
Experience: Principal deferrals have tended to be used by private lenders in conjunction with 
disaster clauses tied to low production levels or commodity prices. They have 
provided a temporary solution to temporary financial problems. When problems, are of 
a long-term nature, deferrals may simply be delaying the inevitable. 
Consequences: • Deferrals can temporarily reduce cash flow requirements of debt servicing. 
• Deferrals may aid in keeping assets (land and machinery) off an already glutted 
market. 
• If the financial stress is due to long-term economic pressures, deferrals of interest 
pay ments make matters worse and further weaken the borrower's financiaJ position. 
• At the end of the deferral period, either the debt will have to be reamortized over a 
longer period or it will be necessary to increase payments because of the larger 
outstanding balance. 
• If financial stress persists and asset markets continue to soften, lenders will 
experience even greater losses and loan risks . . 
• High (low) interest rates can make the carrying cost of a principal defelTal program 
very (moderately) expensive . 
• If recovery does not occur, public cost could be high due to losses on direct 
government loans. 
• Principal and interest deferrals can create a great deal of ill will on the part of 
producers who are paying their debts under their original loan terms. 
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Policy Tool: Principal and Interest Waivers 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
What It Is: Principal and interest waivers are a forgiveness of some portion of a borrower's debt 
obligation. 
Objective: To minimize losses and/or stabilize asset markets. 
When Used: FmHA's debt adjustment program combines a deferral of principal with a waiver of the 
interest on the deferred principal for up to five years. Private lenders have written 
down principal and accrued interest to minimize losses when they feel the borrower 
can adequately service the remaining debt. 
Experience: Principal and interest waivers have been used as a means of minimizing long-run 
losses when adverse economic pressures reduce borrowers' ability to service debt and 
widespread foreclosures would disrupt asset markets. The borrower must have a 
reasonable chance of financial solvency with debt waivers. There has been a hesitancy 
to utilize this option in anticipation that financial conditions might improve. Waivers 
have, therefore, been a last resort option. 
Consequences: • Waivers may make it possible for borrowers to service their remaining debt 
obligations. 
• Principal and interest waivers represent direct subsidies to the borrowers who 
receive them. 
• Interest waivers create a more politically acceptable way to forgive debt than do 
principal waivers, although the actual cost is the same. 
• Waivers by public lenders result in substantial costs to taxpayers. 
• Principal and interest waivers can create a great deal of ill will on the part of 
farmers who ' are paying their debts under their original loan terms. 
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Policy Tool: Principal Buy-Down 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring~ 
What It Is: A principal buy-down is a reduction or forgiveness of part of a borrower's debt in 
return for some fonn of compensation. 
Objective: To reduce loan levels in line with lower asset values and to reduce fanners' debt 
servicing requirements. 
When Used: Used when economic conditions are such that a reduction in total debt is the only way 
a farm can remain solvent and the farm's liquidation would have a politically 
unacceptable impact on asset markets. Since September 1984, FmHA has been 
allowed to issue guarantees of up to 90 percent of loans classified as substandard by 
the lender's supervising agency. To be eligible for the program, the lender is required 
to write-down at least 10 percent of the loan principal or a present value equivalent 
interest rate write-down. The borrower also has to be able to project the ability to 
cash flow the restructured loan. 
Experience: In a case in which the potential losses are reduced, private lenders have been willing, 
in some instances, to write-down part of the outstanding principal and restructure a 
borrower's payments in exchange for a FmHA guarantee on the remaining debt. 
Because the principal must be reduced to the point that the loan will cash flow and the 
guarantee can be for no more than 90 percent of the reduced principal, the program 
has not been widely used. 
Consequences: • Principal buy-downs may make it possible for borrowers to service their remaining 
debt obligations. 
• Principal buy-downs can support asset values by reducing the number of fann 
liquidations .. 
• Although a government guarantee on the remaining debt can protect against further 
losses, private lenders still suffer an equity loss equal to the write-down. 
• Principal buy-downs can result in large public costs if economic conditions fail to 
recover and the government must pay private lenders for losses on guaranteed 
loans. 
• Principal buy-downs can create a great deal of ill will on the part of producers 
who are paying their debts under their original loan tenns. 
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Policy Tool: Two-Tier Debt Restructuring 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Debt or Payment Restructuring 
What It Is: The program would involve classifying a borrower's debt into two tiers. Tier-one debt 
is the debt the borrower could reasonably repay over the next five years, under 
"nonnal" conditions, with payment made on principal and interest at the current market 
rate. Tier-two debt would be all remaining debt and would carry a minimum interest 
rate requiring no principal payments. The amount of tier-two debt equal to the 
principal payment on tier-one debt would shift to tier-one, each year, until all of the 
restructured debt was repaid. 
Objective: To restructure debt based on the repayment ability of the operation. 
When Used: The program was first proposed by the American Farm Bureau in 1985 to deal with 
the existing financial crisis in agriculture. Any new short-tenn operating debt would 
be scheduled for repayment within each production and/or marketing year or offset by 
a minimum inventory of 120 percent of the loan for crops and 130 percent of the loan 
for livestock. Approval for new debt would require demonstration of repayment 
capacity in addition to the repayment requirements of the two-tier program. If a 
financial analysis reveals that no reasonable solution exists for a fanner's financial 
problems and that profitability is not possible through the two-tier debt restructuring, 
then partial or total liquidation of the operation would occur. 
Experience: This proposal has not been tried in agriculture. It is similar in philosophy to existing 
practices involving delinquent foreign debt. 
Consequences: • The program has the economic advantage of being tied to a repayment philosophy 
based on both projected cash flow and profitability . 
• Because of the profitability requirements, structural adjustment would continue to 
take place in agriculture. 
• The program could help avoid overreaction by agricultural lenders and asset 
markets. 
• If the interest rate on tier-two debt were not subsidized, the potential cost to 
lenders would be substantial. 
• If the interest rate on tier-two debt were subsidized, the program would involve 
significant public costs. 
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Policy Tool: Beginning Farmer Programs 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: Direct government loans and/or government agency guarantees of loans made by 
private lenders to beginning farmers. 
Objective: To help beginning farmers with limited resources get started in business by offering 
more favorable terms and loan amounts than would be available from private lenders 
in the case of direct loans or by encouraging private lenders to make loans they would 
not make without a loan guarantee. 
When Used: Beginning farmer loan programs are offered by FmHA and by several states. Interest 
rates and equity requirements on direct loans are usually lower than would be required 
by private lenders. Repayment periods are also often longer than normal market terms 
to reduce debt servicing requirements. Government guarantees of loans made by 
private lenders have generally also involved interest subsidies. Direct loan and 
guaranteed loan program eligibility requirements have usually been subject to age and 
experience limits. 
Experience: Such programs are politically popular because they are aimed at helping people with 
limited resources get started in business. They also address the entrance barrier 
created by increasing capital requirements, as well as the concern that the average age 
of the farm population continues to grow older. 
Consequences: • Subsidized interest rates and more liberal credit terms can encourage new entrants 
into segments of agriculture that already suffer from over-supply and low returns 
to resources. 
• Although beginning farmer programs can help overcome entrance barriers, the size 
of units created may be smaller than what will be required to be economically 
viable. 
• In some cases eligibility requirements have discriminated against young farmers 
with successful track records in favor of new entrants without demonstrated 
management ability. 
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Policy Tool: Borrower Education Requirements 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: FmHA direct or guaranteed farm loan program borrowers would be required to 
participate in approved farm and financial management training until they reached a 
specified level of demonstrated knowledge of the subject matter. 
Objective: To improve borrower's management skills and business performance and to reduce 
related credit problems. 
When Used: FmHA was directed to start a borrower education program in the 1990 farm bill. The 
programs would be offered by existing organizations such as the agricultural extension 
service or community colleges with borrowers being loaned the funds for tuition. 
Programs would be required to cover specified subject matter and be approved by 
FmHA. Participation could be waived if the borrower was certified by FmHA to have 
demonstrated some minimum level of competence and knowledge regarding the 
required subject matter. 
Experience: None. This program has not yet been implemented. 
Consequences: • The program could remove the excuse that borrowers do not know how to keep 
good records, complete financial statements, or develop business plans. 
• By combining classroom education with actual experience, the transfer of 
knowledge could be much greater than with traditional education programs. 
• The quality of borrower loan information provided as the basis for credit 
monitoring and decisions could be significantly improved, thus leading to better 
borrower counseling and credit decisions. This should help reduce FmHA's loan-
loss experience. 
• The improvement of borrower management skills should improve business 
performance and FmHA's graduation rate. 
• This program would complement beginning farmer programs. 
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Policy Tool: Direct Government Loans 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: Direct government loans involve a government agency lending money to specified 
qltegories of borrowers for specific purposes. Frequently, such loans are subsidized 
and made at an interest rate that is less than either the cost to the government or the 
market rate of interest for comparable loans from private lenders. 
Objective: To provide loan funds for purposes deemed to be in the public interest to borrowers 
who cannot obtain financing either in adequate amounts or at reasonable tenns from 
private lenders. 
When Used: FmHA has been the federal government's agricultural lending agency. Several states 
have also initiated agricultural loan programs. FmHA makes both farm operating and 
farm ownership loans. Interest rates on these loans are tied to the government's cost of 
borrowing and are thus lower than comparable conventional loans. A special limited 
resource loan program exists for farmers whose financial condition is such that they 
cannot afford to pay the nonnal interest rate. These loans are made primarily to 
farmers and ranchers who cannot qualify for adequate financing from other lenders and 
are not intended to supplant or compete with credit available from conventional 
lending sources. They are intended to bear the financial and market risk that 
conventional lenders are unwilling or unable to bear. 
Experience: In the early 1980s, the government's share of total producer loans increased to the 
point that there was concern regarding government credit becoming the major source 
of agricultural credit. Concerns still exist concerning the effect of political influence 
on loans made by government agencies. Yet, Congress favors the government credit 
option because the loan is an asset as opposed to a direct government outlay. 
Foreclosure on government loans has been difficult and subject to strong political 
resistance. 
Consequences: • Subsidized interest rates and more liberal credit tenns can encourage new entrants 
and provide continued financing for segments of agriculture that suffer from over-
supply and low returns to resources. 
• Direct loan programs can be used to guide resources into or out of agriculture. 
• Direct loan programs can be used to manage the rate at which asset markets adjust 
to changing economic conditions. 
• Direct loans can be used to encourage the adoption of new technologies and new 
enterprises. 
• Direct loans can be used to encourage adoption of alternative farming systems. 
• Interest subsidies and the cost of administering direct loan programs can be very 
costly to taxpayers. 
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Policy Tool: Economic Emergency Loan Program 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: Economic emergency loans are government loans intended for fanners who are 
suffering economic hardships due to national or regional economic stress, or from 
general tightening of credit, high costs of production, or low fann product prices. 
Objective: To make credit available to fanners suffering financial hardship as a result of the 
negative impact of economic forces beyond their control. 
When Used: The program was created in 1978 and administered by the FmHA primarily to 
refinance debts and provide operating expenses to continue fanning. Loans were made 
regardless of whether financing could be obtained elsewhere. New loans under this 
program have not been made since 1984. 
Experience: The program made billions of dollars of subsidized credit available at a time when real 
interest rates were low to negative. In many respects, it exacerbated the problem by 
deferring normal market adjustments, holding excess resources in agriculture, and 
artificially supporting asset values. When fann income began to tum down in the mid-
1970s, fanners who were only marginally successful (even in good times) and fanners 
who had inadequate repayment capacity found credit markets tightening up. At the 
same time, the land market was relatively tight, and there were successful operators 
who would have purchased assets if the market had been allowed to force unsuccessful 
operators out of fanning. Instead, the economic emergency loan program was created 
on the basis that the problem was short run. The result was that asset values were 
artificially supported and the eventual market collapse was more severe and disruptive 
than it would have been otherwise. 
Consequences: • While credit is a liquidity management tool that can be used to bridge short-term 
cash flow deficiencies and to structure capital debt in line with the repayment 
ability of the assets financed, it will not correct long-term profitability or liquidity 
problems. 
• Interest rates serve to ration available credit. Subsidized interest rates and loans 
based on other than repayment ability tend to distort the allocation process. 
• The program made subsidized loans available to borrowers who were much larger 
than the FmHA's traditional family-size fann requirements. 
• The definition of economic emergency was so broad that the program led to many 
widely documented abuses. 
• Subsidizing interest rates and holding excess resources in agriculture can result in 
asset values being bid up to higher levels than would occur under normal market 
conditions. 
• Additional credit cannot correct an income problem. 
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Policy Tool: Emergency Disaster Loan Program 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: The emergency disaster loan program is a government loan program that makes credit 
available to farmers in areas devastated by natural disasters. 
Objective: To help farmers recover from the effects of natural disasters. 
When Used: FmHA makes disaster loans in locations designated as disaster areas by the President 
or by the Secretary of Agriculture. These loans can be made to compensate for (1) 
actual physical losses directly related to the disaster, (2) annual production expenses 
and other needs arising from natural disasters if the borrower has, when available, 
some "all-risk" crop insurance coverage, and (3) major adjustments in the farming 
operation necessitated by a disaster. 
Experience: Emergency disaster loans have been used to help farmers recover from losses 
experienced as the result of natural disasters. Interest rates on disaster loans are based 
on the government's cost of borrowing for those able to qualify for credit elsewhere 
and subsidized to farmers who are unable to obtain credit elsewhere. 
Consequences: • Credit assistance is provided at times when it is needed most. 
• Subsidized interest rates pass part of the recovery cost on to the taxpayers. 
• Producers are discouraged from obtaining adequate insurance coverage. 
• Crop production is encouraged in high production risk areas. 
107 
Policy Tool: Guaranteed Loans 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: Guaranteed loans involve a government agency agreeing to protect a private 
lender against some or all potential losses resulting from borrower default. 
Objective: To encourage private lenders to make and service loans they would not make 
without a loan guarantee. 
When Used: Guaranteed loans are used to encourage private lenders to make, service, or restructure 
loans to borrowers who exceed the lender's risk requirements. They also have been 
used to encourage lenders to make loans to start-up businesses and minorities. FmHA 
and RDA can guarantee both short-term and long-term loans made by private lenders. 
The loans are funded and serviced by the private lender subject to FmHA or RDA 
approval . Guarantees can generally be extended for up to 90 percent of the loan 
amount. Loan guarantees have political appeal because they are low cost in the short-
run and because the funds flow through the private sector. 
Experience: Guarantees have been moderately effective in encouraging lenders to make new 
loans. Many lenders feel the return from this type of loan is not worth the time 
and red tape involved in meeting the terms of the guarantee provisions. There is 
also some concern about how the terms of the guarantee would be interpreted in 
the event of borrower default. The greatest use of loan guarantees has been to 
restructure existing loans to avoid or reduce potential losses. Lenders also have 
used loan guarantees when financing ventures or enterprises with which they 
have limited experience or when the size of the loan involved puts a 
significant portion of the institution's capital at risk . Some lenders use loan 
guarantees as a means of servicing borrowers who would otherwise exceed the 
institution's legal lending limit. Others use guaranteed loans to increase profits 
by discounting the guaranteed portion into secondary markets. 
Consequences:. Loan guarantees can help fmancially strapped fanners who could recover with continued fmancing 
and restructured loan terms. 
• They can encourage private lenders to fmance new enterprises and technologies. 
• Properly structured, a loan guarantee program may provide the time necessary to implement a more 
permanent solution, thus protecting farm asset markets from collapse. 
• Loan guarantee programs can result in new entrants and continued fmancing for those segments of 
the industry that already suffer from over-supply and low returns to resources. 
• They can positively influence job creation and retention by encouraging fmancing of business start-
ups and expansion of existing businesses that would otherwise be perceived as too high risk for 
private lenders. 
• They can make it possible for rural communities to finance infrastructure improvement and 
maintenance in order to enhance opportunities for economic growth and/or to stem economic decline. 
• Rural communities may realize marginal benefits since losses that would otherwise be borne by firms 
in the local community would be borne by taxpayers. 
• Loan guarantee programs essentially become lender bailouts when improperly structured or when no 
feasible long-term solution exists. 
• If the guaranteed loans are not fmancially sound, the' program can result in large, longer-run public 
outlays. 
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Policy Tool: Rural Development Administration 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Loans 
What It Is: The Rural Development Administration (RDA) involved the creation of a new federal 
lending agency by separating the activities of the FmHA into an agricultural agency 
and a rural development agency. RDA assumes responsibility for FmHA s water and 
sewer, community facility, and business and industrial loan programs. 
Objective: To create a catalyst agency for directing federal assistance to rural areas from federal 
agencies and for fostering cooperation with the states on rural development programs. 
When Used: The creation of RDA in 1992 was authorized by the 1990 farm bill. Its activities 
initially involve a transfer of existing programs and appropriations out of FmHA. To 
date, administrative and regional offices have been opened but no funds have been 
appropriated to hire field staff. Credit analysis, therefore, is being handled by FmHA 
personnel through a memorandum of understanding. 
Experience: The creation of RDA has been embroiled in congressional debates over appropriations 
between those who favored its creation and those who wanted its activities to remain 
under FmHA. Another factor in the debate was opposition to RDA from those 
opposing the creation of a new agency at a time when the USDA is under pressure to 
streamline its operations and reduce its number of field offices. 
Consequences: • Provides a focal point for coordinating federal rural development efforts. 
• Serves as a clearinghouse for information and assistance on rural development 
programs. 
• Reduces many of the frustrations and inefficiencies rural communities and rural 
economic development organizations have experienced trying to work through the 
maze of federal programs. 
• Creates the possibility of increasing and duplicating overhead and administrative 
costs. 
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Policy Tool: Chapter 12 Bankruptcy 
Policy Area: Credit Policy, Government Regulation and Intervention 
What It Is: A business reorganization chapter of the federal bankruptcy code designed exclusively 
for family fanners. 
Objective: To provide a streamlined procedure for fann business reorganization that would allow 
financially distressed family fanns to remain in business if they can present a plan that 
would demonstrate how they could service their debts if the debts were written down 
to the value of the underlying collateral and if creditors were stayed from pursuing 
legal action to collect their loans. 
When Used: The Family Fann Bankruptcy Act went into effect on November 27, 1986, and will 
sunset on October 1, 1993, unless extended by legislative action. Chapter 12 is 
available only to family-held agricultural operations, including family-held 
corporations, with the stipulation that at least 50 percent of the operation must be 
family held and stock or securities cannot be publicly traded. Protection under the Act 
is available to agricultural operations with up to $1.5 million in secured debt, provided 
the families who hold controlling interest in the operation receive at least 50 percent of 
their gross income from the operation and at least 80 percent of the family secured 
debt is involved in the operation, exclusive of debt related to family residences. A 
debtor seeking Chapter 12 protection has 90 days from filing to submit a reorgani-
zation plan to the bankruptcy court, and the judge is required to act on the plan within 
45 days after receiving it. The judge may approve a reorganization plan, even if some 
creditors do not agree to it, provided the plan appears to be in the best interest of all 
concerned. If the plan is approved, the debtor will be under court supervision for three 
to five years. The debtor remains in charge of the agricultural operation, and a court-
appointed trustee ensures that payments are made according to the plan and that no 
fraud or mismanagement occurs. 
Experience: Chapter 12 has resulted in a significant amount of farm debt being discharged and has 
allowed many fanners to remain in business that would have otherwise been forced to 
liquidate as a result of lender collection action. It has also served as a bargaining lever 
for fann debtors by encouraging lenders to agree to debt restructuring rather than face 
the additional costs that would result from bankruptcy. 
Consequences:. Loan write-downs on secured debt and the discharge of unsecured debts may make it possible for 
borrowers to service their remaining debt obligations. 
• Reorganization bankruptcy can support asset values by reducing the amount of assets on the market. 
• Chapter 12 can result in lenders being more willing to negotiate debt restructuring alternatives. 
• Chapter 12 can result in reduced credit being available to farmers who represent higher credit risks 
as lenders seek to avoid situations where they would be legally prohibited [rom collecting loans or be 
forced to write down loans if collateral values deteriorate. 
• Property sold during the plan may generate an income tax obligation that could make restructuring 
plans unworkable for debtors. 
• Secured creditors whose loans are written down to the value of their underlying collateral are 
precluded from benefiting from any improvement in collateral values that occurs after the plan is 
approved. 
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Policy Tool: Farm Credit Administration (FCA) 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
What It Is: FCA is the regulatory agency for the Farm Credit System. 
Objective: To establish regulatory standards for the performance of the System. 
When Used: FCA has existed throughout the life of the Farm Credit System. Until the enactment 
of the 1985 Farm Credit Amendments Act, FCA performed regulatory, public 
TeJations, and aOyocacy functions. This Act materially strengthened FeA s regulatory 
role and eliminated its member-controlled board of directors. 
Experience: Despite changes in its function over time, FCA continued to serve important advocacy 
and public relations functions for the Farm Credit System and had limited regulatory 
powers compared to the regulatory agencies for other financial institutions. 
Establishing lending policies and standards was considerably more decentralized. 
When the farm credit crisis developed in the 1980s, FCA was criticized for not having 
provided adequate regulatory guidance and control. Its regulatory function was, 
therefore, materially strengthened, with the producer control structure severed. 
Consequences: • The 1985 Farm Credit Act dramatically increased the regulatory role of FCA and 
reduced or eliminated its public relations and advocacy role. 
• The 1985 Farm Credit Act changed the function of FCA to be more like the 
regulatory role of the regulators for other financial intermediaries. 
• Independence of the Systems's banks in establishing policy was reduced. 
• Responsiveness of the System to changing conditions was increased. 
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Policy Tool: Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
What It Is: The Fann Credit System Insurance Corporation is a separate entity of the Farm Credit 
System and was chartered to develop and administer a pool of risk capital to ensure 
the timely payment of principal and interest on notes, bonds, debentures, and other 
obligations of participating Fann Credit System institutions. 
Objective: To ensure the financial integrity of financial instruments issued by the Farm Credit 
System Funding Corporation and to guard against the need for future federal financial 
assistance. 
When Used: The Fann Credit System Insurance Corporation was mandated by the Agricultural 
Credit Act of 1987 in conjunction with a financial assistance package establishing 
federal aid to prevent the System from collapsing. The fund is to begin insuring 
obligations in January 1993. 
Experience: The Insurance Corporation was established on January 6, 1988, and was initially 
capitalized by the FCA revolving fund. Beginning in 1989 each System bank was 
insured and subject to the law governing the Insurance Corporation and its powers. 
The initial premium payments began in 1990 with payments based on the accruing and 
nonaccruing loan volume of each bank for the previous year. 
Consequences: • The insurance fund should help ensure the safety of the investors in Farm Credit 
System financial instruments and help maintain the System's low cost of funding . 
• Because the fund will be self-funded by the premiums assessed on the System's 
institutions, it can help avoid the need for public assistance in the event of future 
financial problems. 
• As a policy tool, the level of premiums and size of the fund deemed necessary by 
the Insurance Corporation to ensure actuarial soundness can influence the credit 
policies and lending philosophy of the System's lending institutions. 
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Policy Tool: Foreclosure Moratorium 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
What It Is: Foreclosure moratoria forces lenders to stop foreclosures on agriculture-related loans. 
Objective: To temporarily relieve the financial obligations of financially pressed borrowers with 
excessive debt. 
When Used: Moratoria were applied under the Frazier-Lemke Act in the 1930s to bankruptcy 
proceedings. The moratorium was applied to real estate mortgage loans. In recent 
years, various states have also instituted temporary moratoria on farm foreclosures . 
FmHA was prohibited from foreclosing on borrowers from May 1983 through 
November 1985 as a result of the Coleman vs. Block lawsuit. 
Experience: During the Frazier-Lemke Act moratorium in the 1930s, a farm was appraised and the 
courts granted a stay of proceedings for three years, during which time the fanner 
retained possession of the property and paid rent for its use. Within three years, the 
farmer could pay the appraised value and redeem the property. If the property was not 
redeemed, it would be sold to satisfy the debt against it and the farmer would not be 
held liable for loan amounts greater than the appraised value of the property or its sale 
price. The various moratoria imposed on or by the FmHA have simply been stays of 
foreclosure. The farmer was given time to restructure debt and service the loan 
obligations. 
Consequences: • Conditional or limited moratoria can be used to encourage reluctant lenders to use 
public sector assistance programs or accept forbearance and other restructuring 
approaches. 
• A moratorium can be successful only if the financial conditions of the firm and/or 
the industry "improve during the period so the borrower can pay the debts or if the 
asset markets can absorb the assets at more favorable prices. 
• A moratorium can help temporarily stabilize asset values because fewer assets are 
forced on the market. 
• Security interest in farm collateral is materially reduced. 
• A moratorium tends to make credit less available and raise interest rates for those 
borrowers not subject to foreclosures in order to compensate lenders for the higher 
credit risks. 
• Costs to lenders resulting from the nonpayment of interest, collateral depreciation, 
and additional borrower operating losses during a moratorium can be substantial. 
• A moratorium serves to hold surplus resources in agriculture. 
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Policy Tool: Warehousing Farm Assets, Agriculture Conservation Corporation 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Government Regulation and Intervention 
What It Is: A proposal to form a government corporation to purchase assets (land andequipment) 
from problem farm loans at a "fair" market value. Assets acquired under the program 
would either be retired or later resold or leased back to farmers. 
Objective: To stabilize the value of agricultural assets and to prevent further erosion of fanners' 
equity and lenders' collateral values. 
When Used: An Agricultural Conservation Corporation was proposed as a limited life program to 
be used when adverse economic conditions result in large numbers of foreclosures and 
voluntary liquidations. The program would support asset values by taking surplus 
assets off the market. 
Experience: None. The program has not been implemented. The concept appeared to be rejected 
based on the potential for extensive government ownership of farmland and equipment. 
Consequences: • To the extent assets,_ particularly land, are retired from production, the program 
would serve a double purpose in asset stabilization and supply control. 
• By allowing lenders to sell acquired property and farmers to sell distressed assets, 
the program would reduce losses associated with foreclosures. 
• Sale of assets would be very unpopular when they force down local land and 
equipment values. 
• The release price for assets would serve to set a ceiling on asset values until all 
assets in the program are sold. 
• The initial cost to the government of acquiring sufficient assets to stabilize fann 
asset markets would be substantial. 
• Losses to lenders and farmers resulting from owning assets earning less than their 
carrying costs would be passed to taxpayers. 
• Problems of establishing "fair" market value and targeting assistance would raise 
questions of equity and be difficult to administer. 
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Policy Tool: Secondary Markets for Agricultural Loans 
Policy Area: Credit Programs, Secondary Financial Markets 
What It Is: Secondary markets involve the originating lender selling loans or claims on agricultural 
loans to investors. In its most limited sense, the process involves a direct transaction 
between the original lender and an investor. A potential exists for greater liquidity 
when brokers act as middlemen to facilitate the sale of loans or loan participations to 
investors. An extension would be to establish an agricultural credit corporation to pool 
loans and sell negotiable pooled participations (or mortgage bonds) to investors. 
Objective: To add liquidity, spread lending risks, and broaden the market for agricultural loans . 
When Used: Existing secondary markets for agricultural loans include the sale of farm mortgage 
loans by originating lenders to life insurance companies. There is a highly developed 
secondary market fo r FmHA guaranteed loans through brokers. Commercial banks 
have long used the sale of loan participations to correspondent banks as a means of 
funding agricultural loans. The Farm Credit Banks can also discount short- and 
intermediate-term agricultural loans from commercial banks and agricultural credit 
corporations. These are funded by the sale of consolidated Farm Credit System bonds 
and notes. Major banks have also used bankers' acceptances as a means of marketing 
agricultural loans in established secondary markets. 
Experience: The Farm Credit Banks, correspondent banking relationships, and secondary markets 
for bankers acceptances and government guaranteed loans provide several alternatives 
for marketing short- and intermediate-term agricultural loans. Secondary markets for 
farm real estate loans are not nearly so well developed. Most farm mortgages sold by 
originating lenders to insurance companies are on a prearranged basis. The Federal 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation was authorized by the Agricultural Credit Act of 
1987. "Farmer Mac" provides a secondary market for farm real estate mortgages, rural 
housing loans, and the guaranteed portion of FmHA loans. Although loan pools have 
been created, Farmer Mac has been less active than anticipated. The program involves 
the creation of a government-backed agricultural credit corporation to pool farm 
mortgages and sell pooled participations or mortgage bonds in a manner similar to the 
Federal National Mortgage Corporation which buys residential mortgages. 
Consequences: • Secondary markets expand agriculture's access to capital markets. 
• Secondary markets could add liquidity to the farm real estate mortgage market. 
• The sale of loans into the secondary market and the purchase of participations in loan 
pools could allow agricultural lenders to diversify their portfolios. 
• Secondary markets may enable lenders to service borrowers who would otherwise exceed 
their legal lending limit. 
• The ability to offer fixed rate loans may help reduce the restrictions on credit availability 
during periods of high loan demand. 
• The underwriting standards for secondary markets can help in upgrading and standardizing 
financial reporting requirements for farm · borrowers. 
• Extended periods in which loanable funds exceed effective loan demand may create 
problems in maintaining the viability of secondary markets. 
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